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INTRODUCTION
“In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or
without trial is the carefully limited exception.”1 Writing for the
Supreme Court majority in the 1987 case United States v. Salerno, Chief
Justice Rehnquist conjured up this utopia; however, the reality in the
United States has become quite the opposite. Federal and state jail and
prison populations have skyrocketed since the 1970s.2 In particular,
there has been a marked increase in the number of individuals
imprisoned in jails pretrial and thus before conviction,3 largely through

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (emphasis added).
According to The Sentencing Project, the United States prison population experienced
seven hundred percent growth between 1972 and its peak in 2009. NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH, U.S.
PRISON POPULATION TRENDS: MASSIVE BUILDUP AND MODEST DECLINE 1 (2019),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/u-s-prison-population-trends-massivebuildup-and-modest-decline [https://perma.cc/U29D-3LX7]. As of March 2020, the Prison
Policy Initiative reported that “[t]he American criminal justice system holds almost 2.3 million
people.” WENDY SAWYER & PETER WAGNER, MASS INCARCERATION: THE WHOLE PIE 2020
(2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html [https://perma.cc/7YNR-44HM]. Of
those 2,300,000 people, state prisons confine approximately 1,300,000 people, state jails confine
746,000, and federal prisons and jails together confine 226,000. Id.
3 As of March 2020, sixty-five percent—470,000 of the 746,000 people held in jails—had not
yet been convicted of the crime for which state authorities held them. SAWYER & WAGNER, supra
note 2. The Vera Institute of Justice reached similar conclusions:
1
2

This “pretrial population” has grown significantly over time—increasing 433 percent
between 1970 and 2015, from 82,922 people to 441,790. People held in pretrial
detention accounted for an increasing proportion of the total jail population over the
same time period: 53 percent in 1970 and 64 percent in 2015. This growth is in large
part due to the increased use of monetary bail.
LÉON DIGARD & ELIZABETH SWAVOLA, VERA INST. OF JUST., JUSTICE DENIED: THE HARMFUL
AND LASTING EFFECTS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION 1 (2019) (footnotes omitted),
https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/Justice-Denied-Evidence-Brief.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WR63-X3VV].
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the use of financial conditions of pretrial release like bail.4 In its simplest
form, bail is an amount of money or property established by a judge at
arraignment, which a criminal defendant may post to remain out of jail
during the proceedings leading up to and including trial.5 Judges
typically fix bail to ensure that the individual appears in court when
necessary.6 Declining to post bail or, more commonly, lacking the
financial means to do so, means that the state or federal government
will incarcerate the individual during the pendency of their trial.7
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required,”8 but its text is
silent on whether there exists an absolute right to the opportunity to
post bail. After the 1984 Federal Bail Reform Act explicitly permitted
preventive detention,9 the Salerno Court reiterated that the Eighth

4 “A significant driver of the growing number of people in jail awaiting trial has been a
paradigm shift toward financial conditions of pretrial release. . . . As a result, members of the
poorest communities are harmed most profoundly, despite constitutional prohibitions on
punishing people for their poverty.” DIGARD & SWAVOLA, supra note 3, at 2.
5 The State of New York, for example, defines bail as follows:

A court fixes bail when, having acquired control over the person of a principal, it
designates a sum of money and stipulates that, if bail in such amount is posted on
behalf of the principal and approved, it will permit him to be at liberty during the
pendency of the criminal action or proceeding involved.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 500.10(3) (McKinney 2020).
Black’s Law Dictionary primarily defines “bail” as “[a] security such as cash, a bond, or property;
esp., security required by a court for the release of a criminal defendant who must appear in court
at a future time.” Bail, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see also Robert Webster Oliver,
Bail and the Concept of Preventative Detention, 69 N.Y. ST. BAR J. 8, 8 (1997) (“‘Bail’ usually
means cash money or a bail bond and is an amount fixed by the Court which is posted by, or on
behalf of, the defendant which will be delivered to the Court and held to assure the defendant’s
return to Court whenever necessary.” (footnote omitted)).
6 The American Bar Association adds that “[b]ail is not a fine. It is not supposed to be used
as punishment. The purpose of bail is simply to ensure that defendants will appear for trial and
all pretrial hearings for which they must be present.” How Courts Work, A.B.A. (Sept. 9, 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_related_education_
network/how_courts_work/bail [https://perma.cc/5THD-CWZZ].
7 See id.; BERNADETTE RABUY & DANIEL KOPF, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, DETAINING THE
POOR 1 (2016), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/DetainingThePoor.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3X3P-D4TA] (“With money bail, a defendant is required to pay a certain amount of money as a
pledged guarantee he will attend future court hearings. If he is unable to come up with the money
either personally or through a commercial bail bondsman, he can be incarcerated from his arrest
until his case is resolved or dismissed in court.” (footnotes omitted)).
8 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
9 Preventive detention is the detention of a defendant leading up to trial without affording
them the opportunity to post bail. Preventive Detention, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed.
2019) (“Confinement imposed usu. on a criminal defendant who has threatened to escape, poses
a risk of harm, or has otherwise violated the law while awaiting trial . . . .”); see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(e)(1) (“If . . . the judicial officer finds that no condition or combination of conditions will

CHASIN.43.1.5 (Do Not Delete)

276

10/3/21 7:30 PM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1

Amendment’s bail clause does not convey an absolute right to bail.10 In
upholding the 1984 Federal Bail Reform Act as facially valid, the Salerno
Court held that the reach of the Eighth Amendment’s bail clause goes
only so far as to prohibit the imposition of bail that is “excessive” given
the circumstances.11 In short, a criminal defendant does not have an
absolute right to the opportunity to post bail; it is constitutional for the
federal government to incarcerate an individual pretrial without giving
them the chance to meet financial conditions of release.12 The State of
New York, in its state constitution, adopted language substantively
identical to that of the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution,13 and the New York Court of Appeals has long confirmed
the lack of a constitutional right to bail.14
The State of New York has contributed substantially to nationwide
pretrial detention populations.15 Throughout 2019, sixty percent of the

reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person
and the community, such judicial officer shall order the detention of the person before trial.”).
10 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752 (1987) (“The Eighth Amendment addresses
pretrial release by providing merely that ‘[e]xcessive bail shall not be required.’ This Clause, of
course, says nothing about whether bail shall be available at all.”).
11 Id. at 754 (“The only arguable substantive limitation of the Bail Clause [of the Eighth
Amendment] is that the Government’s proposed conditions of release or detention not be
‘excessive’ in light of the perceived evil.”).
12 See id.
13 Compare N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 5 (“Excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines
imposed, nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted, nor shall witnesses be
unreasonably detained.”), with U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). But for the omission
of a single comma in New York State’s bail clause, New York’s bail clause mirrors the version
found in the United States Constitution.
14 See, e.g., People ex rel. Shapiro v. Keeper of City Prison, 49 N.E.2d 498, 500 (N.Y. 1943)
(“[B]ut in the States like New York, whose Constitutions follow the Federal model in this respect
by prohibiting ‘excessive bail,’ such a constitutional declaration as to bail accords no accused any
right to bail, but serves only to forbid excessiveness.” (citation omitted)); People ex rel. Fraser v.
Britt, 43 N.E.2d 836 (N.Y. 1942) (affirming lower court’s authority to deny defendant’s
application for bail); People ex rel. Klein v. Krueger, 255 N.E.2d 552, 554 (N.Y. 1969) (reaffirming
that “the State constitutional guarantee against excessive bail does not require that bail be given
as of right in all noncapital cases”); see also People ex rel. Lobell v. McDonnell, 71 N.E.2d 423,
425 (N.Y. 1947) (explaining that bail may not be “excessive” but that “[t]he bailing court has
a . . . judicial, not a pure or unfettered discretion” in determining whether the amount of bail is
excessive).
15 Then–New York Governor Andrew Cuomo’s 2019 State of the State Book included the
following information:
A review of 2018 cases conducted by the Division of Criminal Justice Services showed
that, in cases where bail is set, people are still in jail five days after bail is set in 66
percent of New York City cases and 64 percent of cases outside of New York City. This
means that there are at least 45,500 people in jail annually across the state because they
can’t pay bail.
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New York jail population consisted of individuals incarcerated not for
the conviction of any crime, but instead because they could not make
bail.16 These numbers become even more staggering when trained on
New York City in particular, where almost ninety percent of people
arrested for misdemeanors cannot post bail set at one thousand dollars
or less.17 As startling as these figures might be, the repercussions of
imprisonment for failure to post bail extend far beyond one’s actual
period of imprisonment pending trial. Not only are individuals held on
bail nine times more likely to plead guilty to a misdemeanor than those
free pending trial,18 but spending time confined in jails or prisons19—
particularly in pretrial detention—begets lifelong deleterious effects.20

ANDREW M. CUOMO, 2019 JUSTICE AGENDA: THE TIME IS NOW 140 (2019) [hereinafter 2019
JUSTICE
AGENDA],
https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/
2019StateoftheStateBook.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9LB-KWS5].
16 “On any given day in early 2019, more than 22,000 New Yorkers were incarcerated in
a local jail—about 8,000 in New York City and 14,000 in the rest of the state. As is the
case in local jails across the country, more than six in ten of these individuals were held
pretrial, prior to a conviction, usually stemming from an inability to afford money
bail.”
MICHAEL REMPEL & KRYSTAL RODRIGUEZ, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, BAIL REFORM IN NEW
YORK: LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW YORK CITY 1 (2019) [hereinafter
2019 BAIL REFORM IN NEW YORK], https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/media/
document/2019/Bail_Reform_NY_full_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/2K2U-6TKR].
17 “In [New York City], nearly 90% of people charged with misdemeanors can’t afford bail of
$1,000 or less. As a result, on average, they will spend over two weeks in jail at Rikers Island.”
BROOKLYN CMTY. BAIL FUND, MASS INCARCERATION FACT SHEET 1 (2020) [https://perma.cc/
K3LN-LFWY].
18 Id. Nationwide, a 2018 study by the American Economic Review similarly revealed that
initial pretrial release decreases the probability of being found guilty by 14.0 percentage
points, a 24.2 percent change from the mean for detained defendants . . . . The decrease
in conviction is largely driven by a reduction in the probability of pleading guilty,
which decreases by 10.8 percentage points, a 24.5 percent change.
Will Dobbie, Jacob Goldin & Crystal S. Yang, The Effects of Pretrial Detention on Conviction,
Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM. ECON. REV.
201, 203 (2018).
19 Although the terms “prison” and “jail” are often used interchangeably, each facility serves
a distinct purpose. Prisons are generally state or federal facilities that hold individuals “in longterm confinement as punishment for a crime, or in short-term detention while waiting to go to
court as criminal defendants.” Prison, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Alternatively,
jails are generally “a local government’s detention center where persons awaiting trial or those
convicted of misdemeanors are confined.” Jail, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see
also What Is the Difference Between Jails and Prisons?, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS. [https://perma.cc/
9ET3-B383]; Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1579 n.76 (2003).
20 “Each year in prison takes 2 years off an individual’s life expectancy. With over 2.3 million
people locked up, mass incarceration has shortened the overall U.S. life expectancy by almost 2
years.” Emily Widra, Incarceration Shortens Life Expectancy, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar.
2021), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/06/26/life_expectancy [https://perma.cc/VZJ7FQDQ].
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The tragic experience of Kalief Browder captured the conscience
of New Yorkers and Americans alike,21 as the many broken aspects of
our criminal justice system, including New York’s pretrial detention
mechanisms, converged on Mr. Browder to steal his life.22 On May 15,
2010, an officer arrested Mr. Browder, a sixteen-year-old Black kid from
The Bronx, after Mr. Browder was accused of stealing a backpack.23 Mr.
Browder’s bail was set at three thousand dollars, an amount beyond his
and his family’s financial means.24 As a result, he was confined to Rikers
Island, a notoriously violent jail complex,25 during the pendency of his
trial.26 In spite of the Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial guarantee,27 Mr.
Browder spent over three years on Rikers Island pretrial, about two
years of which he dwelt in solitary confinement.28 On May 29, 2013,
after Mr. Browder had already suffered years of mental and physical
abuse, and after surviving attempts to take his own life, he was released
from Rikers Island; after over three years, the District Attorney decided
to drop the case, deeming it too weak to take to trial.29 Although Mr.
See generally Time: The Kalief Browder Story (Spike television broadcast Mar. 1, 2017).
Much of the tragedy around Mr. Browder’s ordeal lies not in its uniqueness, but rather in
its representation of innumerable similarly appalling stories. See, e.g., Matt Taibbi, Jailed for Being
Broke, ROLLING STONE (June 23, 2015, 1:00 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politicsnews/jailed-for-being-broke-72132 [https://perma.cc/KS2N-SFRV].
23 Like Chief Justice Rehnquist naively viewed pretrial detention as the “carefully limited
exception,” the arresting officer in Mr. Browder’s case believed the same, misinforming Mr.
Browder that he was “just going to take [Mr. Browder] to the precinct. Most likely [Mr. Browder]
can go home.” Mr. Browder would not go home for more than three years. Jennifer Gonnerman,
Before the Law, NEW YORKER (Sept. 29, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/
06/before-the-law [https://perma.cc/BDU9-S748]; see United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755
(1987).
24 Seventy-four days later, Mr. Browder was indicted on second-degree robbery charges. The
Department of Probation determined this was a probation violation from an earlier incident,
leading the judge to remand Mr. Browder without bail. Gonnerman, supra note 23.
25 A one-time slaughterhouse for pigs and a one-time landfill, Rikers Island confines
thousands of individuals and has provided the backdrop for far too many violent, lethal
encounters to list here; the maelstrom that is Rikers Island warrants a Note unto itself, but for an
inside look at life on Rikers Island from those confined there and those who work there, see
Noreen Malone & Raha Naddaf, This Is Rikers: From the People Who Live and Work There,
MARSHALL PROJECT (June 28, 2015, 9:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/06/28/
this-is-rikers [https://perma.cc/Y6CT-2FWD].
26 Id.
27 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
28 Mr. Browder was frequently placed in solitary confinement after fights with other
incarcerated people. Gonnerman, supra note 23 (“Not long after arriving on Rikers, Browder
made his first trip to solitary confinement. It lasted about two weeks, he recalls, and followed a
scuffle with another inmate.”); Benjamin Weiser, Kalief Browder’s Suicide Brought Changes to
Rikers. Now It Has Led to a $3 Million Settlement., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/24/nyregion/kalief-browder-settlement-lawsuit.html
[https://perma.cc/9S8S-T4LV].
29 Gonnerman, supra note 23.
21
22

CHASIN.43.1.5 (Do Not Delete)

2021]

10/3/21 7:30 PM

TWO STEPS FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK

279

Browder was finally freed from Rikers Island, sans guilty plea or
conviction,30 his life was irreparably altered.31 On June 6, 2015, Mr.
Browder took his own life at the age of twenty-two.32 This chilling
excerpt further illustrates the tragedy:
“He may have hung himself, but the strings were pulled by the
system,” Venida [Browder] once said. This is a reality that Kalief
Browder’s mother lived with every day: that her son didn’t take his
own life so much as submit to a weight he carried with him out of
the hole. The imagery sticks: Kalief’s body, the cord around his neck,
its other end disappearing somewhere in the depths of Rikers Island.33

Mr. Browder’s death wrought by the icy steel hands of New York’s
criminal justice system precipitated the State’s newfound effort to
reform its racially34 and economically discriminatory bail system.35
In April 2019, New York State enacted sweeping reforms to its
criminal justice system set to take effect on January 1, 2020.36 Among
Id.
In Mr. Browder’s own words upon his release, “I’m not all right. I’m messed up.” Alysia
Santo, No Bail, Less Hope: The Death of Kalief Browder, MARSHALL PROJECT (June 9, 2015, 6:04
PM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/06/09/no-bail-less-hope-the-death-of-kaliefbrowder [https://perma.cc/D8AC-HRS3].
32 Natalie Chang, This Is Solitary, ATLANTIC (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/
sponsored/spike/this-is-solitary/1245 [https://perma.cc/Q7H8-A7HY]; see Jennifer Gonnerman,
Kalief Browder, 1993–2015, NEW YORKER (June 7, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/news/
news-desk/kalief-browder-1993-2015 [https://perma.cc/Z4KB-STJF].
33 Chang, supra note 32 (emphasis added).
34 See JAEOK KIM, QUINN HOOD & ELLIOT CONNORS, VERA INST. OF JUST., THE IMPACT OF
NEW YORK BAIL REFORM ON STATEWIDE JAIL POPULATIONS: A FIRST LOOK 16 (2021),
https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/the-impact-of-new-york-bail-reform-onstatewide-jail-populations.pdf [https://perma.cc/DZ96-WM67] (recounting preexisting racial
disparities in New York City pretrial admissions and analyzing bail reform’s lack of impact on
those disparities).
35 Mr. Browder’s death brought to the forefront the issue of reforming the State’s system of
pretrial detention:
30
31

The move to sharply curtail the use of cash bail, in many ways, was the long-awaited
response to the case of Mr. Browder . . . . For many left-leaning politicians, he is a
symbol of the problems inherent in the bail system, which they argue discriminates
against the poor. When Democrats seized control of the state Legislature last fall, the
party finally appeared poised to stop the use of cash deposits or bonds to ensure people
return to court. . . . Andrea Stewart-Cousins, a Westchester County Democrat,
reiterated that she and fellow Democrats in her chamber wanted to “make sure that
we’re not criminalizing poverty, and that there would never, ever, ever be another
instance of a Kalief Browder.”
Jesse McKinley & Ashley Southall, Kalief Browder’s Suicide Inspired a Push to End Cash Bail. Now
Lawmakers Have a Deal., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/29/
nyregion/kalief-browder-cash-bail-reform.html [https://perma.cc/UFG8-5QKQ].
36 See generally S. 1509, 2019 Leg., 242d Sess. (N.Y. 2019); Barry Kamins, Annual Review of
New Criminal Justice Legislation, 91 N.Y. ST. BAR J. 24 (2019) (summarizing the reforms).
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the goals of these reforms, the State intended to diminish economic
inequality in its bail and pretrial detention systems. Before turning even
three months old, these reforms reduced the pretrial prison population
in New York City by forty percent: as of March 5, 2020, about three
thousand people were in New York City prisons awaiting trial, down
from nearly five thousand people at the time of the reform’s
enactment.37 Progress notwithstanding, just months after the new bail
law had taken effect, the Legislature enacted a series of amendments,
restoring the bail law somewhat closer to its original state before the
April 2019 reforms.38
This Note will analyze how, despite the fact that New York’s bail
reforms reduced city and state prison populations, the revised bail law
falls flat in its attempt to resolve the economic inequality in the State’s
pretrial detention system—an overarching purpose of the reforms.39
Part I of this Note will chronicle the turbulent recent history of bail
reform in New York and will describe the key differences between the
old bail laws, the reformed bail laws, and the amendments to those
reforms. Part II will analyze how the current state of New York’s pretrial
detention system does little to address the Legislature’s goals. After
assessing the shortcomings of the newly minted—and subsequently
reminted—bail law, Part III of this Note will offer solutions to ensure
that the bail law achieves its intended purposes. These solutions will
focus on securing an individual’s return to court and reducing pretrial
detention, while also ensuring that an individual’s wealth does not
decide their freedom while they await trial.

37 MICHAEL REMPEL & KRYSTAL RODRIGUEZ, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, BAIL REFORM
REVISITED: THE IMPACT OF NEW YORK’S AMENDED BAIL LAW ON PRETRIAL DETENTION 12
(2020) [hereinafter BAIL REFORM REVISITED], https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/
files/media/document/2020/bail_reform_revisited_05272020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X2A7E2LM].
38 See Jamiles Lartey, New York Rolled Back Bail Reform. What Will the Rest of the Country
Do?, MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 23, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/
04/23/in-new-york-s-bail-reform-backlash-a-cautionary-tale-for-other-states [https://perma.cc/
Y9TB-KBU7]; Beth Fertig, What the New Rollbacks to Bail Reform Mean in New York,
GOTHAMIST (July 2, 2020, 8:07 PM), https://gothamist.com/news/what-new-rollbacks-bailreform-mean-new-york [https://perma.cc/TYK9-3V3G].
39 See S. 1509, 2019 Leg., 242d Sess., Part JJJ (N.Y. 2019).
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I. BACKGROUND
A.

New York’s Bail History, in Brief

Bail and pretrial detention are far from novel tools of “criminal
justice”; their usage spans thousands of years.40 In New York, the recent
bail reform efforts are not the first time New Yorkers have focused their
radar on this ancient aspect of the criminal justice system.41 Bail reform
efforts in New York have roots that stretch to the 1960s and beyond.42
After learning of—and expressing horror at—New York City’s prison
population in 1960, Louis Schweitzer, a retired chemical engineer and
businessman,43 teamed up with Herbert Sturz, a magazine editor, to
found the nonprofit Vera Foundation,44 known today as the Vera
Institute of Justice.45 The Vera Foundation’s initial iteration had one
primary mission: to create a bail fund geared toward shrinking New
York City’s rising pretrial prison population.46 Though this bail fund
would help some individuals gain a semblance of freedom before trial,

40 TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE, MICHAEL R. JONES & CLAIRE M. B. BROOKER, THE HISTORY OF
BAIL AND PRETRIAL RELEASE 1 (2010), https://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/ccjj/Committees/BailSub/
Handouts/HistoryofBail-Pre-TrialRelease-PJI_2010.pdf
[https://perma.cc/45YY-GNY4]
(“While the notion of bail has been traced to ancient Rome, the American understanding of bail
is derived from 1,000-year-old English roots. . . . ’[B]ail [originally] reflected the judicial officer’s
prediction of trial outcome.’ In fact, bail bond decisions are all about prediction, albeit today
about the prediction of a defendant’s probability of making all court appearances . . . .” (second
alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)).
41 See, e.g., Bail Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1965, at 34.
42 See generally CTR. ON THE ADMIN. OF CRIM. L., N.Y.U., PREVENTIVE DETENTION IN NEW
YORK: FROM MAINSTREAM TO MARGIN AND BACK (2017), https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/
default/files/upload_documents/2017-CACL-New-York-State-Bail-Reform-Paper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8KC7-CM5V].
43 1970s Mr. Schweitzer might have been further horrified if 1990s Mr. Schweitzer told him
that, before the turn of the millennium, New York City’s pretrial prison population would more
than double. See Incarceration Trends, VERA INST. OF JUST. [https://perma.cc/8M7R-7UEA]
(detailing the explosion of New York City’s pretrial prison population from around 6,300 in 1970
to over 14,500 in 1995); see also Lee S. Friedman, The Evolution of a Bail Reform, 7 POL’Y SCIS.
281, 285 (1976) (“The germination of what was soon to become the Vera Foundation occurred
in the Fall of 1960 at a cocktail party, when Louis Schweitzer was asked if he was aware of the
number of people confined in the New York City jails awaiting trial. Astounded by an answer of
‘thousands,’ he arranged through Anna Kross, then New York City’s Commissioner of
Corrections, to tour the facilities.”).
44 Friedman, supra note 43, at 285–86.
45 Today, Vera’s mission is “[t]o end the overcriminalization and mass incarceration of
people of color, immigrants, and people experiencing poverty.” It envisions “[s]afe, healthy,
empowered communities and a fair, accountable justice system.” About Us, VERA INST. OF JUST.,
https://www.vera.org/about [https://perma.cc/P9LW-KHUU].
46 Friedman, supra note 43, at 286.
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it would never resolve the underlying issues wrought by New York’s
harsh bail system.47 This realization brought about the Manhattan Bail
Project. The Project identified indigent defendants who posed little risk
of flight to avoid prosecution. It then recommended to judges who
should be granted release through the pendency of their trial.48 This
study quickly proved a reliable tool—perhaps as reliable as bail itself—
in predicting and ensuring an individual’s return to court.49 A year
before the Manhattan Bail Project concluded operations, New York
City institutionalized the Project’s release on recognizance procedures
in the Office of Probation.50
In the years following the efforts of the Vera Foundation and the
Manhattan Bail Project, the issues of bail and, in particular, preventive
detention remained at the forefront of the conversation around
criminal justice reform.51 Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, advocates
split on whether the State should allow judges to impose preventive
detention because the individual posed a risk to public safety,52 or
whether the practice should be outlawed.53 Studies have shown that the
consideration of public safety or “dangerousness” can function as a
proxy for racism, as judges are more likely to find nonwhite defendants

Id. at 287.
Id. As the Project grew more successful, it continued to recommend the release of more
individuals on their own recognizance:
47
48

In its first months the Project recommended only 27 percent of their interviews for
release. After almost a year of successful operation, with the growing confidence of
judges, the Project recommended nearly 45 percent of arrestees for release. After three
years of operation, the percentage grew to 65 percent with the Project reporting that
less than one percent of releases failed to appear for trial.
SCHNACKE, JONES & BROOKER, supra note 40, at 10.
49 “During the 3 year experiment, 3505 defendants had been granted ROR following
Vera recommendations. Only 56 parolees, or 1.6% of the total, failed to appear. The
ROR system, as used in the experiment, seemed at least as reliable as bail (4% fail to
appear) in ensuring appearance for a large number of defendants.”
Friedman, supra note 43, at 290–91.
50 Id. at 292–93. In 1973, the Pretrial Services Agency (PTSA) was created to take over the
program and in 1977, “PTSA became independent from Vera and was incorporated as the New
York City Criminal Justice Agency.” MARY T. PHILLIPS, A DECADE OF BAIL RESEARCH IN NEW
YORK CITY 2 (2012), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/DecadeBailResearch12.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2X26-996U].
51 See CTR. ON THE ADMIN. OF CRIM. L., supra note 42, at 1–3.
52 “Proponents of the practice suggested it would improve public safety and [would allow]
judges to be candid about a factor they already covertly considered.” Id. at 3.
53 “Critics countered that judges and lawyers could not accurately predict who would be a
danger if released. They also believed the practice was antithetical to the notions of due process
and the Constitution’s prohibitions on excessive bail.” Id.
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more “dangerous” than white defendants.54 Although New York opted
not to allow for preventive detention on the basis of public safety, the
vast majority of jurisdictions nationwide—both federally and at the
state level—allow preventive detention on this basis.55 Although the
Supreme Court in 1987 declared preventive detention on the basis of
risk to public safety constitutional,56 New York remains, to this day, in
the scant minority of states prohibiting the practice.57 In the years since,
the question has thus morphed from whether preventive detention is
constitutional to whether preventive detention is fair and just.
B.
1.

New York’s 2019 Bail Reforms

Political Context of the 2019 Reforms

“Akeem, I want you to know that your brother did not die in
vain,”58 then–New York Governor Andrew Cuomo vowed to Kalief
Browder’s brother during his 2018 State of the State address, promising
to rectify New York’s cruel criminal justice system.59 Among an array
of criminal justice reforms, Governor Cuomo specifically proposed an
54 See Roxanna Asgarian, The Controversy Over New York’s Bail Reform Law, Explained, VOX
(Jan. 17, 2020, 8:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/identities/2020/1/17/21068807/new-york-bailreform-law-explained [https://perma.cc/QZQ7-9M2A] (“The idea of ‘dangerousness,’ advocates
stress, is tied into the racial discrepancies of our justice system. Two studies of state court data
from 75 large jurisdictions in the 1990s found that bail was set at significantly higher rates for
black and Latinx people.”). Nonwhite defendants are denied bail more often than white
defendants, and mean bail amounts are higher for nonwhite defendants than for white
defendants. See generally Traci Schlesinger, Racial and Ethnic Disparity in Pretrial Criminal
Processing, 22 JUST. Q. 170 (2005); Stephen Demuth, Racial and Ethnic Differences in Pretrial
Release Decisions and Outcomes: A Comparison of Hispanic, Black, and White Felony Arrestees,
41 CRIMINOLOGY 873 (2003).
55 “New York ultimately decided against allowing preventive detention. This choice was
praised as a victory for civil liberties. However, in the years that followed, the national tide turned
firmly in favor of preventive detention.” CTR. ON THE ADMIN. OF CRIM. L., supra note 42, at 3.
56 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987). For a more thorough look into the
constitutionality of preventive detention, see CTR. ON THE ADMIN. OF CRIM. L., supra note 42, at
6–9.
57 CTR. ON THE ADMIN. OF CRIM. L., supra note 42, at 1; PHILLIPS, supra note 50, at 25.
58 Andrew Cuomo, Governor Cuomo Outlines 2018 Agenda: Realizing the Promise of
Progressive Government, YOUTUBE, at 46:22–28 (Jan. 3, 2018), https://youtu.be/N4SVFp8EFXw
[https://perma.cc/23V6-MF3B].
59 Id. at 41:40. For a written transcript of Governor Cuomo’s 2018 State of the State address,
see Video, Audio & Rush Transcript: Governor Cuomo Outlines 2018 Agenda: Realizing the
Promise of Progressive Government, N.Y. STATE (Jan. 3, 2018) [https://perma.cc/B67F-9WLY]
(“Our bail system is biased against the poor . . . . [O]ur jails are filled with people who should not
be incarcerated. . . . The blunt ugly reality is that too often, if you can make bail you are set free
and if you are too poor to make bail you are punished.”).
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overhaul to New York’s bail laws.60 But the time was not politically ripe
for the passage of such reforms into law: although a Democraticmajority Assembly was paired with a Democratic governor, a
Republican-majority Senate forestalled any chance of substantive
criminal justice reform. Bail reform became a much more plausible
reality when the New York State Senate gained a Democratic majority
in the November 2018 elections.61 With the Assembly maintaining a
Democratic majority62 and Democratic Governor Cuomo winning
reelection,63 the Democratic Party assembled its first “trifecta”64 since
2010.65 Finally, New York State seemed poised to make good on the
Governor’s promise to Akeem Browder: to enact meaningful,
progressive bail reform.66 For perhaps the first time in decades, the State
seemed unified in pursuing and achieving this elusive goal.
60

Governor Cuomo outlined the following priorities of potential reforms:

We must reform our bail system so a person is only held if a judge finds either a
significant flight risk or a real threat to public safety. If so, they should be held in
preventive detention whether they are rich or poor, black or white—but if not, they
should be released on their own recognizance whether they are rich or poor, black or
white. That is only fair. Race and wealth should not be factors in our justice system.
It’s that clear.
Cuomo, supra note 58, at 43:09–54 (emphasis added). Incorporating public safety into judges’
bail decisions would have constituted a major departure from decades and decades of prior New
York State law. See generally infra Section II.A.
61 New York State Senate Elections, 2018, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/New_York_
State_Senate_elections,_2018 [https://perma.cc/WD22-LHKF] (“Democrats gained control of
the chamber and expanded their majority in the 2018 elections for the New York State Senate,
winning 40 seats to Republicans’ 23. All 63 Senate seats were up for election. At the time of the
election, Democrats held 32 seats to Republicans’ 31. However, Republicans controlled the
chamber, as one Democratic state senator caucused with the Republican Party.”).
62 New York State Assembly Elections, 2018, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/New_
York_State_Assembly_elections,_2018 [https://perma.cc/XL38-FX9C] (“Democrats held their
veto-proof majority in the 2018 elections for New York State Assembly, winning 106 seats to
Republicans’ 43 and the Independence Party’s one. All 150 assembly seats were up for election in
2018. At the time of the election, Democrats held a 104–41 majority.”).
63 New York Gubernatorial and Lieutenant Gubernatorial Election, 2018, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/New_York_gubernatorial_and_lieutenant_gubernatorial_election,_2018
[https://perma.cc/YZ34-V8TF].
64 Party Control of New York State Government, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Party_
control_of_New_York_state_government [https://perma.cc/DG3Y-4ZEQ] (“Trifectas influence
how hard a party must work to advance its agenda. When one party controls the three vital
centers of state political power—the office of the governor, the state House, and the state Senate—
Ballotpedia considers that party to control a ‘trifecta.’ Trifectas make it easier for the dominant
party to pursue its agenda, and more difficult for opposition parties to challenge it.”).
65 Id. (“In New York, Democrats held trifecta control of state government from 2009 to 2010.
In all other years from 1992 to 2017, control of state government was divided.”).
66 Russell Berman, Democrats in New York Are Ready to Deploy Their Newfound Power,
ATLANTIC (Dec. 22, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/12/democratsnew-york-cuomo-progressive-agenda/578896 [https://perma.cc/DM9U-Q22B] (“The result [of
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Emboldened by a more progressive state government and by bail
reforms in states including California and New Jersey,67 Democratic
leadership in New York expressed an interest in ending the use of bail
altogether.68 Although there seemed to be widespread support for this
position, disagreement on other issues prevented serious movement in
the effort to eliminate bail. Specifically, unlike federal law,69 New York
law allowed judges to consider only the likelihood of an individual’s
return to court when making bail decisions,70 long disallowing judges
from considering the individual’s “dangerousness” or risk to public
safety.71 Akin to the travails of decades earlier,72 views on whether public
safety should be a valid concern of judges in making bail decisions
the 2018 elections] is the most commanding governing majority Democrats have had in New
York in decades, giving the party a seemingly unfettered opportunity to enact legislation that has
been bottled up for years and to place the state firmly on the leading edge of progressive policy
nationwide. In the next several months, Democrats hope to . . . end a cash-bail system blamed
for enabling mass incarceration. . . . On criminal-justice reform, activists have secured Cuomo’s
support for making the state the second in the nation, after California, to end cash bail.”).
67 For example, Senate Bill 10, eliminating cash bail entirely, had just been signed into law in
California. However, after a challenge by the bail bond industry, California voters rejected
Proposition 25 in the 2020 elections, thereby repealing Senate Bill 10 and allowing cash bail in
California to see another day. The Times Editorial Board, Editorial: The Welcome but Glacial
Dismantling of California’s Bail System, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2019, 3:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2019-12-16/eliminate-bail-in-california-justice
[https://perma.cc/2HZ7-YHAC]; California Proposition 25, Replace Cash Bail with Risk
Assessments Referendum (2020), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_
25,_Replace_Cash_Bail_with_Risk_Assessments_Referendum_(2020)
[https://perma.cc/
WRD3-2PED]. In 2017, New Jersey eliminated cash bail almost in its entirety. See N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:162-15 (West 2017).
68 In addition to Governor Cuomo’s initial proposal to end cash bail, Assembly Speaker Carl
Heastie explained that “[t]he Assembly Majority remains committed to reforming the state’s
antiquated criminal justice system by . . . ending cash bail.” Press Release, Carl E. Heastie,
Assemb. Speaker, Assembly 2019-20 Budget Includes Funding to Combat Gang Violence and
Invests in Programs to Help New Yorkers Navigate the Criminal Justice System (Mar. 13, 2019),
https://nyassembly.gov/Press/?sec=story&story=85594 [https://perma.cc/76L4-GG2U].
69 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b)–(c)(1) (allowing judges to consider whether releasing the
individual “will endanger the safety of any other person or the community” when making bail
decisions); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987) (holding constitutional the 1984
Bail Reform Act’s provision that judges may consider danger to the community when setting
bail).
70 Cf. In re Restaino, 890 N.E.2d 224 (N.Y. 2008) (removing from the bench a judge who
committed forty-six individuals into custody, revoking their recognizance release and imposing
bail, after a cell phone went off in the courtroom and none of the individuals claimed ownership
of the device).
71 Cf. Sardino v. State Comm’n on Jud. Conduct, 448 N.E.2d 83, 84 (N.Y. 1983) (removing
from the bench a judge who “regularly abused his authority with respect to setting bail . . . [by]
acting punitively with little or no interest in the only matter of legitimate concern, namely,
whether any bail or the amount fixed was necessary to insure the defendant’s future appearances
in court” and who “often ordered defendants to be held without bail for no apparent reason”).
72 See supra Section I.A.
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presented a formidable obstacle73: although Senate Majority Leader
Andrea Stewart-Cousins and Assembly Speaker Carl Heastie agreed
that “dangerousness” should not be introduced into the equation out of
fear of its racist outcomes,74 Governor Cuomo had initially proposed to
do just that.75 The solution was compromise. The 2019 bail reforms that
Governor Cuomo would eventually sign into law neither entirely
eliminated bail, nor did they introduce the concept of public safety into
judges’ bail decisions.76
Instead, when the lawmakers struck a deal, the reforms explicitly
introduced a presumption of release, providing a nondiscretionary
baseline that the court shall release an individual on their own
recognizance, unless that individual poses a flight risk,77 tilting the scale
further toward release rather than confinement. When a court
determined that an individual posed a risk of flight to avoid
prosecution, it was now required to “select the least restrictive
alternative and condition or conditions that will reasonably assure the
principal’s return to court.”78 In the past, setting bail had functioned as
the default for many offenses, but the reforms made nearly all
misdemeanors and nonviolent felonies ineligible for bail.79 For some
qualifying offenses—mainly violent felonies—a judge could still fix bail,
but only if the judge deemed it the least restrictive method of assuring
a defendant’s return to court.80
Beyond these fundamental alterations to New York’s pretrial
detention system, the initial reforms put into place three other
See infra Section II.A.
See Dan M. Clark, NY Senate Dems Have Reservations About ‘Dangerousness’ Standard in
Bail Reform Bill, Leader Says, N.Y.L.J. (Mar. 27, 2019, 3:31 PM), https://www.law.com/
newyorklawjournal/2019/03/27/ny-senate-dems-have-reservations-about-dangerousnessstandard-in-bail-reform-bill-leader-says [https://perma.cc/NM49-GPSH].
75 See id.
76 “Bail reform, which was a major sticking point among lawmakers in recent weeks, will
leave the option of cash bail in place for most violent felony offenses, Class A felonies and a list
of other charges outlined in the bill.” Dan M. Clark, Cuomo, Lawmakers Announce Deal on State
Budget, Criminal Justice Reforms, N.Y.L.J. (Apr. 1, 2019, 11:15 AM), https://www.law.com/
newyorklawjournal/2019/03/31/cuomo-lawmakers-announce-deal-on-state-budget-criminaljustice-reforms [https://perma.cc/5WT8-E3LY].
77 “[T]he court shall release the principal pending trial on the principal’s own recognizance,
unless it is demonstrated and the court makes an individualized determination that the principal
poses a risk of flight to avoid prosecution.” N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.10(1) (McKinney 2020)
(effective Jan. 1, 2020 to July 1, 2020) (emphases added). The statute’s prior language required
the court to release the principal on their own recognizance, fix bail, or commit the principal to
the sheriff’s custody, but it did not indicate any presumption. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.10
(McKinney 2019) (effective through Dec. 31, 2019).
78 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.10(1) (McKinney 2020) (effective Jan. 1, 2020 to July 1, 2020).
79 See id. § 510.10(4) (effective Jan. 1, 2020 to July 1, 2020).
80 Id.
73
74
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significant changes: (1) requiring judges to offer individuals three forms
of bail for eligible offenses;81 (2) providing a variety of nonmonetary
conditions that judges could impose to ensure an individual’s return to
court;82 and (3) instructing judges to consider an individual’s “activities
and history” when making decisions about pretrial conditions.83
2.

Three Forms of Bail

In those circumstances where the charged offense qualified for bail
and a court determined that fixing bail was the least restrictive
condition to ensure the individual’s return to court, the reforms
required judges to provide the individual with at least three methods of
posting bail from an authorized list of options.84 Previously, judges were
permitted, though not required, to offer individuals multiple methods
of posting bail,85 although multiple forms were rarely offered. Not only
did the reforms mandate that judges fix at least three forms of bail, but
they also required that judges select at least one of a partially secured
surety bond86 or an unsecured surety bond87 as an option.88 The reforms
retained earlier language that, when fixing multiple forms of bail, judges
“may designate different amounts varying with the forms.”89

See infra Section I.B.2; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 520.10.
See infra Section I.B.3; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 500.10(3-a) (effective Jan. 1, 2020 to July
1, 2020).
83 See infra Section I.B.4; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(1).
84 The list of nine authorized forms of bail remained unchanged from the statute’s prior
iteration. The authorized forms of bail are (a) cash bail, (b) insurance company bail bond, (c)
secured surety bond, (d) secured appearance bond, (e) partially secured surety bond, (f) partially
secured appearance bond, (g) unsecured surety bond, (h) unsecured appearance bond, and (i)
credit card or similar device. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 520.10. For definitions of each of the
authorized forms of bail, see id. § 500.10.
85 Id. § 520.10(2)(b) (effective through Dec. 31, 2019).
86 A surety is “an obligor who is not a principal.” Id. § 500.10(12). A surety bond is “a bail
bond in which the obligor or obligors consist of one or more sureties or of one or more sureties
and the principal.” Id. § 500.10(15). That the bond is partially secured means that the surety’s
up-front monetary deposit may not exceed ten percent of the total amount of the undertaking.
Id. § 500.10(18). In simpler terms, a partially secured surety bond “allows defendants (or their
friends or family) to pay 10 percent or less of the total bail amount up front; the balance is only
paid if the defendant skips court.” 2019 BAIL REFORM IN NEW YORK, supra note 16, at 4.
87 That the bond is unsecured means that it is “not secured by any deposit of or lien upon
property.” N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 500.10(19). In non-statutory language, an unsecured bond
functions similarly to a partially secured bond, except it does not require any up-front payment.
2019 BAIL REFORM IN NEW YORK, supra note 16, at 4.
88 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 520.10(2)(b).
89 Id.
81
82
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Previously, judges could fix bail with total disregard for the
individual’s financial circumstances, without considering whether there
was even a remote possibility that the individual could post bail.90 With
the introduction of the reforms, judges, if fixing bail, now had to
consider the individual’s financial circumstances and whether fixing
bail would impose undue hardship on the individual.91
3.

Nonmonetary Conditions of Release

In conjunction with the institution of a presumption of release, the
reforms introduced into law the concept of nonmonetary conditions as
a method for securing the return to court of an individual deemed a risk
of flight to avoid prosecution.92 Since the 2019 reforms made most
misdemeanors ineligible for bail,93 when an individual was charged with
a bail-ineligible misdemeanor, judges now possessed two options: (1)
by default, release the individual on their own recognizance, or (2) if the
individual is deemed a risk of flight to avoid prosecution, impose the
least restrictive nonmonetary condition(s) that would reasonably assure
the individual’s return to court.94 Excised from judges’ toolkits was the
option to fix bail for this group of charged offenses.95

See id. § 510.30 (effective through Dec. 31, 2019).
In determining whether monetary bail would be the least restrictive condition that would
reasonably assure the individual’s return to court, judges must consider “the principal’s
individual financial circumstances, and, in cases where bail is authorized, the principal’s ability
to post bail without posing undue hardship, as well as his or her ability to obtain a secured,
unsecured, or partially secured bond.” Id. § 510.30(1)(f).
92 Id. § 510.10(1) (effective Jan. 1, 2020 to July 1, 2020).
93 Id. § 510.10(4) (effective Jan. 1, 2020 to July 1, 2020). According to the Center for Court
Innovation, the initial bail reforms “disallow[ed] money bail in almost all cases charged with a
misdemeanor, with two exceptions: (1) sex offense misdemeanors, and (2) misdemeanor
criminal contempt (PL 215.50) where there is an underlying allegation of domestic violence.”
2019 BAIL REFORM IN NEW YORK, supra note 16, at 2.
94 The relevant statute reads as follows:
90
91

In cases other than as described in subdivision four of this section the court shall
release the principal pending trial on the principal’s own recognizance, unless the court
finds on the record or in writing that release on the principal’s own recognizance will
not reasonably assure the principal’s return to court. In such instances, the court shall
release the principal under non-monetary conditions, selecting the least restrictive
alternative and conditions that will reasonably assure the principal’s return to court.
The court shall explain its choice of alternative and conditions on the record or in
writing.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.10(3) (effective Jan. 1, 2020 to July 1, 2020).
95 See id.
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Even when an individual was charged with one of the dwindling
number of qualifying offenses,96 judges retained the discretion to release
the individual on their own recognizance.97 However, if a judge deemed
an individual a risk of flight to avoid prosecution, that judge remained
obligated to select the least restrictive condition that would reasonably
assure that individual’s return to court.98 For those qualifying offenses,
that least restrictive condition could be bail or it could be nonmonetary
conditions if the judge thought them necessary to ensure the
individual’s return to court.99 Only where the individual was charged
with a qualifying felony could the judge consider remanding the
individual to custody.100 Even in such cases, remand would only be
appropriate if it were the least restrictive condition that would
reasonably assure the individual’s return to court.101
The reforms provided judges with a non-exhaustive list102 of
nonmonetary conditions from which they could choose to impose any
one, or a combination of conditions, the least restrictive of which would
reasonably ensure the individual’s return to court.103 The statute

96 See id. § 510.10(4) (effective Jan. 1, 2020 to July 1, 2020) (listing charged offenses for which
a judge retained discretion to set bail or, for qualifying felonies, remand an individual to custody).

The law establishes nine criteria where both money bail and remand remain
permissible in felony cases, while also indicating a range of other options that should
be considered in these cases, including release on the defendant’s own recognizance or
non-monetary conditions such as pretrial supervision. As a practical matter, the nine
criteria permit bail and detention with nearly all violent felonies but rule it out with
nearly all nonviolent felonies.
2019 BAIL REFORM IN NEW YORK, supra note 16, at 2.
97 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.10(4) (effective Jan. 1, 2020 to July 1, 2020).
98 Id. § 510.10(1).
99 Id. § 510.10(4).
100 Id.
101 Id. § 510.10(1) (effective Jan. 1, 2020 to July 1, 2020) (“If such a finding is made [that the
individual poses a risk of flight to avoid prosecution], the court must select the least restrictive
alternative and condition or conditions that will reasonably assure the principal’s return to
court.”).
102 Before listing a series of possible conditions, the statute provides that “[s]uch conditions
may include, among other conditions reasonable under the circumstances.” Id. § 500.10(3-a)
(effective Jan. 1, 2020 to July 1, 2020) (emphasis added).
103 The text of the statute provides the following examples of nonmonetary conditions, among
others not listed here:
Such conditions may include, among other conditions reasonable under the
circumstances: (1) that the principal be in contact with a pretrial services agency
serving principals in that county; (2) that the principal abide by reasonable, specified
restrictions on travel that are reasonably related to an actual risk of flight from the
jurisdiction . . . ; (3) that the principal refrain from possessing a firearm, destructive
device or other dangerous weapon; (4) that . . . the person be placed in reasonable
pretrial supervision with a pretrial services agency serving principals in that
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provided that the “principal shall not be required to pay for any part of
the cost of release on non-monetary conditions.”104
4.

“Activities and History”

Lawmakers maintained the State’s status quo by withholding from
judges the explicit authority to consider “dangerousness” or threat to
public safety when making bail decisions.105 In fact, the revised statute
added language that judges consider “information about the principal
that is relevant to the principal’s return to court,”106 which had been
absent from the statute’s previous iteration.107 Once a judge decided that
an individual posed a risk of flight to avoid prosecution, that judge was
now left with the task of determining which condition(s) would be the
least restrictive to secure the individual’s return to court.108 To guide
judges in this determination, the reforms provided a revised list of
factors for judges to consider and take into account.109 While many of
the factors remained substantively similar to the statute’s prior version,
the reforms removed from consideration “[t]he principal’s character,
reputation, habits and mental condition,”110 among other
considerations, replacing them with “[t]he principal’s activities and
history.”111

county; . . . (5) that . . . the principal’s location be monitored with an approved
electronic monitoring device.
Id. (numbering added for clarity).
104 Id.
105 See infra Section II.A; Clark, supra note 76. The words “dangerousness,” “public,” and
“safety” do not appear in the statute. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(1).
106 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(1) (emphasis added).
107 See id. § 510.30 (effective Dec. 24, 2012 to Dec. 31, 2019).
108 Id. § 510.30.
109 Compare id. (effective Jan. 1, 2020), with id. (effective Dec. 24, 2012 to Dec. 31, 2019).
110 Id. § 510.30(2)(a)(i) (effective Dec. 24, 2012 to Dec. 31, 2019).
111 Id. § 510.30(1)(a) (emphasis added).
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New York’s 2020 Amendments to the Reforms
1.

Backlash to the 2019 Reforms

New York’s bail reform saga did not end with the introduction of
2019’s reforms.112 Although the reforms quickly reduced prison
populations,113 they were met with severe pushback from various media
outlets,114 from the New York Police Department (NYPD),115 and even
directly from the New York City police commissioner.116 Local media
seized on the story of a mentally ill Black woman who was rearrested
upon being released without bail to conclude that the bail reforms had
failed.117 If this style of dog-whistle-laden attack evokes decades-old
112 See generally Kim Bellware, Class Race and Geography Emerge as Flashpoints in New York’s
Bail Reform Debate, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2020, 1:41 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
nation/2020/02/15/new-york-bail-reform [https://perma.cc/FR7M-US86].
113 BAIL REFORM REVISITED, supra note 37, at 12.
114 Local tabloids criticized the reforms as the source of a purported—though disputed—
crime uptick, writing incendiary, and sometimes outright false, headlines such as “Revolving
Door Lunacy,” “No Bail Madness,” “The Feds Can’t Save New York from the Insane ‘No-Bail’
Law,’” and “Set Free to Rape: Suspect Busted in Train Station Sex Assault Was Freed Through
State’s New Bail Reform Laws,” among countless others. Lartey, supra note 38; Laura Bennett,
Media Must Focus News Coverage on Facts, Not on Fear, TIMES UNION (May 27, 2021, 5:00 AM),
https://www.timesunion.com/opinion/article/Media-must-focus-news-coverage-on-facts-noton-16205702.php [https://perma.cc/8WXZ-LWLL]; Post Editorial Board, The Feds Can’t Save
New York from the Insane ‘No-Bail’ Law, N.Y. POST (Jan. 28, 2020, 8:24 PM), https://nypost.com/
2020/01/28/the-feds-cant-save-new-york-from-the-insane-no-bail-law [https://perma.cc/KXP7LM5H].
115 Coinciding with the start of the new year and the implementation of these reforms was a
reported crime increase. NYPD reported a 22.5% crime increase in February 2020 and exclaimed
that “[c]riminal justice reforms serve as a significant reason New York City has seen this uptick
in crime.” NYPD Announces Citywide Crime Statistics for February 2020, N.Y. POLICE DEP’T
(Mar. 5, 2020), https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/news/pr0305/nypd-citywide-crime-statisticsfebruary-2020 [https://perma.cc/932D-BZRV]. However, criminal justice reform advocates and
experts expressed skepticism, explaining that the number of arraignments had decreased by
twenty percent, which “starkly contradict[s] claims by the New York Police Department that
crime has risen since the new bail law went into effect on January 1, 2020.” Erin Durkin, NYPD,
de Blasio Blame Bail Reform for Crime Spike as Defenders Question Police Stats, POLITICO (Mar.
5, 2020, 6:41 PM), https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/story/2020/03/05/nypdreports-spike-in-crime-as-public-defenders-question-the-stats-1265616
[https://perma.cc/
86K7-BEXG].
116 In response to the passage of the reforms, New York City Police Commissioner Dermot
Shea penned an op-ed in the New York Times in which he stoked fear in the community, making
dubious claims that the reforms “present a significant challenge to public safety” and that
“[v]iolent criminals are being returned to the community.” Dermot Shea, New York’s New Bail
Laws Harm Public Safety, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/23/
opinion/shea-nypd-bail-reform.html [https://perma.cc/YA38-YK43].
117 On December 27, 2019, amid a spate of anti-Semitic hate crimes, Tiffany Harris, a thirtyyear-old Black woman from Brooklyn suffering from mental health issues, allegedly physically
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memories, it might not be a coincidence.118 Specifically, parallels
abound with the 1988 United States presidential election, when a
George H.W. Bush–backing political action committee ran the
notorious “Willie Horton ad”119 as a way of attacking Democratic
nominee Michael Dukakis and his views on criminal justice.120 In each
slapped and yelled slurs at a group of Orthodox Jewish women. Harris was arrested and charged
with attempted assault as a hate crime. Woman Charged with Hate Crime Amid NYC Anti-Semitic
Attacks,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(Dec.
28,
2019),
https://apnews.com/article/
8fab4c32e88141001024c2d6a8467eda [https://perma.cc/Z4WL-4N86]. Just days in advance of
the bail reforms taking effect, Harris was released without bail. Id. The next day, while out on
bail, Harris allegedly assaulted another victim. NYC Woman Accused of Anti-Semitic Attacks
Arrested Again a Day After Release, NBC N.Y. (Dec. 30, 2019, 3:18 AM),
https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/nyc-woman-accused-of-anti-semitic-attacksarrested-again-a-day-after-release/2252361 [https://perma.cc/83C3-XUJQ]. Harris was again
released without bail and was again rearrested, this time for failure to comply with the courtimposed nonmonetary conditions of her release. Rebecca Rosenberg, Paul Martinka, Reuven
Fenton & Laura Italiano, Hate Crime Suspect Tiffany Harris Arrested for Third Time in One Week,
N.Y. POST (Jan. 1, 2020, 9:02 AM), https://nypost.com/2020/01/01/hate-crime-suspect-tiffanyharris-arrested-for-third-time-in-three-days [https://perma.cc/B5DL-A56Y]. Local media
outlets were quick to vilify the brand new reforms, calling them “soft on crime” and
“troublesome.” See, e.g., Andrew Denney, Emily Saul & Rebecca Rosenberg, Tiffany Harris
Indicted on Felony Hate-Crime Charges—but Still Won’t Face Bail, N.Y. POST (Jan. 14, 2020, 10:06
PM), https://nypost.com/2020/01/14/tiffany-harris-indicted-on-felony-hate-crime-charges-butstill-wont-face-bail [https://perma.cc/WNJ2-QJGA].
118 Per Vincent M. Southerland, “[r]acist [f]earmongering . . . is among the strongest tools in
the anti-reform toolbox.” Vincent M. Southerland, The Racist Fearmongering Campaigns Against
Bail Reform, Explained, APPEAL (June 7, 2021), https://theappeal.org/the-lab/explainers/theracist-fearmongering-campaigns-against-bail-reform-explained
[https://perma.cc/43KZXRTE]. Southerland writes that “[e]xamples abound” of this sort of racist fearmongering:
Richard Nixon’s racially coded law and order presidential campaign, George H.W.
Bush’s use of Willie Horton to portray Michael Dukakis as soft on crime, Bill Clinton’s
tough-on-crime campaign messaging, and Donald Trump’s embrace of law
enforcement and harsh criminal and immigration system policies are the legacies of
centuries-old attitudes rooted in white anxiety and fear. The debunked
“superpredator” myth, which produced a wave of death in prison sentences for youth,
is another.
Id. See generally Rachel Withers, George H.W. Bush’s “Willie Horton” Ad Will Always Be the
Reference Point for Dog-Whistle Racism, VOX (Dec. 1, 2018, 4:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/
2018/12/1/18121221/george-hw-bush-willie-horton-dog-whistle-politics
[https://perma.cc/
6AAX-QVR3].
119 National Security PAC, Willie Horton 1988 Attack Ad, YOUTUBE (Nov. 4, 2008),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Io9KMSSEZ0Y
[https://perma.cc/8ZU2-BMXJ].
See
generally Jon Schuppe, Fair or Dangerous? Days After Ending Cash Bail, New York Has Second
Thoughts, NBC NEWS (Jan. 7, 2020, 4:30 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/crime-courts/
fair-or-dangerous-days-after-ending-cash-bail-new-york-n1111346
[https://perma.cc/J7DAR6P7].
120 William Horton is a Black man from South Carolina who had been convicted, and was
serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole, for a murder he committed in 1974. In
1986, Horton was furloughed from a Massachusetts prison to which he never returned. In 1987,
Horton raped a woman and stabbed her fiancé, before he was apprehended. Dukakis, thengovernor of Massachusetts, supported the furlough program. Bush supporters leveraged
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instance, detractors of progressive criminal justice policy relentlessly
parroted the case involving a single Black individual to demonstrate the
policy’s shortcomings. Then, as now, the unfortunate exception to
progress made in the criminal justice arena was leveraged as an attack
on the movement as a whole.121
The vocal pushback to the new reforms precipitated amendments
to those reforms. Detailed in the following Section, these amendments
would be, in essence, rollbacks of the initial reforms, reining in New
York’s criminal justice system closer to where it stood before the April
2019 reforms.122 The Legislature’s hedge of rolling back the reforms—
but only partially so—pulled off the remarkable feat of dissatisfying
advocates on both sides of the ever-polarized bail debate, alike.123
2.

Rollbacks of the 2019 Reforms

Before detailing how the amendments altered the initial reforms,
it is worth highlighting the key components of the reforms that
remained intact.124 Fundamental to the reforms, the amendments
retained the presumption of release.125 When determining the least
restrictive conditions to secure an individual’s return to court, judges
must still consider an individual’s “activities and history.”126 And before
concluding that bail would indeed be the least restrictive condition,
judges must still consider any undue hardship fixing bail would pose
due to the individual’s financial circumstances.127 When fixing bail is
the least restrictive condition for a qualifying offense, judges must still
Dukakis’s position to create the inflammatory ad, “insinuat[ing] [that], if you elect Governor
Dukakis as president, we’re going to have black rapists running amok in the country.”
Race2012pbs, 1988: Willie Horton Ad, YOUTUBE, at 0:50 (Oct. 10, 2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dwWbkb-TKho
[https://perma.cc/FH94-AJK6].
See
generally Beth Schwartzapfel & Bill Keller, Willie Horton Revisited: We Talk to the Man Who
Became Our National Nightmare. Thirty Years Later, Does He Still Matter?, MARSHALL PROJECT
(May 13, 2015, 6:37 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/05/13/willie-hortonrevisited [https://perma.cc/Z7UL-HPJ7]. Dukakis would go on to lose the 1988 election to Bush.
See generally Monte Piliawsky, Racial Politics in the 1988 Presidential Election, 20 BLACK
SCHOLAR 30 (1989).
121 See Doug Criss, This Is the 30-Year-Old Willie Horton Ad Everybody Is Talking About
Today, CNN (Nov. 1, 2018, 6:17 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/01/politics/willie-hortonad-1988-explainer-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/H8XF-3YJW].
122 Lartey, supra note 38; Fertig, supra note 38.
123 “And while advocates were crushed by the setback, the move was still insufficient for the
most fervent opponents of the law.” Lartey, supra note 38.
124 See generally BAIL REFORM REVISITED, supra note 37.
125 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.10(1) (McKinney 2020).
126 Id. § 510.30(1)(a).
127 Id. § 510.30(1)(f).
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offer it in at least three forms.128 In an attempt to ensure that indigent
people can afford bail, at least one of those forms must still be a partially
secured surety bond or an unsecured surety bond.129 Spared from
revision throughout both the 2019 reforms and the 2020 amendments
was the language that judges “may designate different amounts varying
with the forms” of bail they decide to fix.130
On April 3, 2020, the Legislature enacted various amendments to
the bail reforms. Two amendments in particular hinder the progress
made in reducing economic inequality in New York’s pretrial system.131
First, the amendments expanded the list of qualifying offenses, allowing
judges to fix bail in a wider array of cases.132 Misdemeanors and
nonviolent felonies, such as bail jumping or financial crimes, were
relabeled qualifying offenses—a category that had previously included
mainly violent felonies.133 In many instances, these were the very same
misdemeanors and nonviolent offenses that were deemed nonqualifying offenses just months earlier.134
Additionally, the amendments altered the definition of
nonmonetary conditions, expanding the enunciated list of
nonmonetary conditions from which judges could select. Among the
added nonmonetary conditions were restrictions on who the individual
could associate with, various forms of mandatory programming, and
orders of protection.135 While judges were already required to select the
least restrictive conditions that would “reasonably assure the principal’s

Id. § 520.10(2)(b).
Id.
130 Id.
131 The amendments, which were certain to increase prison and pretrial populations, were
signed into law in the heart of the COVID-19 pandemic in which jails and prisons were
particularly rampant hotspots for the virus. See, e.g., Beth Schwartzapfel, Katie Park & Andrew
Demillo, 1 in 5 Prisoners in the U.S. Has Had COVID-19, MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 18, 2020,
6:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/12/18/1-in-5-prisoners-in-the-u-s-hashad-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/C3QC-U84B]; Nick Pinto, Amid Coronavirus Crisis, Andrew
Cuomo Held New York’s Health Care Hostage to Undo Criminal Justice Reforms, INTERCEPT (Apr.
3, 2020, 3:06 PM), https://theintercept.com/2020/04/03/andrew-cuomo-coronavirus-bailcriminal-justice [https://perma.cc/5Q2A-7XXK].
132 BAIL REFORM REVISITED, supra note 37, at 2–5.
133 Id.
134 The Center for Court Innovation estimated that the amendments to the reforms would
have led to an additional six thousand individuals eligible for bail based on 2019 arraignment
data. Id. at 8.
135 Compare N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 500.10(3-a) (effective July 2, 2020), with id. (effective
Jan. 1, 2020 to July 1, 2020).
128
129
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return to court,” the amendments added that those conditions must also
“reasonably assure the principal’s compliance with court conditions.”136
II. ANALYSIS
This Part will parse the goals of the New York State Legislature in
enacting the various reforms to its Criminal Procedure Law137 and
outline the ways in which these laws in their current state fail to achieve
their intended purpose of reducing economic inequality in the State’s
pretrial detention system.138 The reformed and amended bail laws fall
short of their goals because they allow judges to retain discretion in two
troublesome ways. First, judges’ discretion in setting the amounts of
partially secured surety and appearance bonds inhibits the decrease in
pretrial detention,139 and second, imprecise criteria allow judges to
retain the discretion to weave public safety and “dangerousness” into
bail decisions,140 each of which disparately impacts less-wealthy
individuals.
“As a general rule, words used in Penal Law and Criminal
Procedure Law are to be given their usual ordinary and commonly
accepted meaning.”141 Legislative provisions governing bail must be
related to proper purposes for detention of defendants prior to
conviction and judicial applications of discretion authorized by the
Legislature must be similarly related.142
A.

The Legislature’s Intent

Since 1971, judges in New York have not been permitted to
consider a criminal defendant’s threat to public safety or
“dangerousness” when making decisions on bail or other pretrial

136 The meaning of this seemingly circular language is not clear and has not yet been
interpreted by courts. See id. (effective July 2, 2020). The Center for Court Innovation
understands that “one plausible interpretation is that a judge may add further conditions, so long
as they aid someone’s ability to comply with the judge’s initial, minimum conditions.” BAIL
REFORM REVISITED, supra note 37, at 5 (emphasis added).
137 See infra Section II.A.
138 See infra Sections II.B–II.C.
139 See infra Section II.B.
140 See infra Section II.C.
141 People v. Chensky, 120.N.Y.S.3d 621, 623 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020); accord People v. King, 463
N.E.2d 601, 603 (N.Y. 1984); People v. Munoz, 615 N.Y.S.2d 730, 731 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1994).
142 People ex rel. LaForce v. Skinner, 319 N.Y.S.2d 10 (Sup. Ct. 1971); Chensky, 120 N.Y.S.3d
621.
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conditions.143 Unlike most of the United States,144 and unlike the
provisions set forth in the 1984 Federal Bail Reform Act,145 public safety
and dangerousness have not been written into New York law as
potential considerations for judges.146 Although the Eighth
Amendment’s bail clause has never been construed to prohibit
considerations of public safety and dangerousness,147 and although the
United States Supreme Court has deemed constitutional the
consideration of dangerousness in pretrial detention decisions,148
legislative and judicial history in New York show public safety and
dangerousness have, in fact, been uniquely excluded from consideration
by judges in New York.149

143 “[S]ince 1971, public safety—the idea of the ‘potential dangerousness’ of someone accused
of a crime—has not been a legal reason to set bail for a defendant in New York.” Asgarian, supra
note 54.
144 New York is one of only four states in the United States (Connecticut, Mississippi, and
Missouri being the others) that does not allow its judges to consider public safety and
dangerousness when making bail decisions. CTR. ON THE ADMIN. OF CRIM. L., supra note 42, at
1; PHILLIPS, supra note 50, at 25.
145 Although the federal Bail Reform Act of 1966 did not allow judges to consider public safety
when making bail decisions in noncapital cases, the Bail Reform Act of 1984, which amended the
1966 law, allowed judges to do just that. Patricia M. Wald & Daniel J. Freed, The Bail Reform Act
of 1966: A Practitioner’s Primer, 52 A.B.A. J. 940, 940 (1966) (“In two major respects the [1966]
act falls short of completely revising the old bail system: it does not authorize courts to consider
danger to the community in setting conditions of pretrial release in noncapital cases; and, while it
subordinates, it fails to eliminate money as a condition which can cause the detention of persons
unable to raise it.”) (emphasis added); CHARLES DOYLE, BAIL: AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAW 4–5 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40221.pdf [https://perma.cc/98YLSY93] (“In 1984, Congress amended federal bail law to permit the use of preventive detention in
certain limited instances when the accused posed a danger to the public or particular members
of the public.”); 18 U.S.C. § 3142.
146 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(1) (McKinney 2020).
147 “Nothing in the text of the Bail Clause limits permissible Governmental considerations
solely to questions of flight. The only arguable substantive limitation of the Bail Clause is that the
Government’s proposed conditions of release or detention not be ‘excessive’ in light of the
perceived evil.” SCHNACKE, JONES & BROOKER, supra note 40, at 18.
148 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747–49 (1987) (upholding as a legitimate
regulatory goal in making pretrial detention decisions the consideration of preventing danger to
the community).
149 See, e.g., CTR. ON THE ADMIN. OF CRIM. L., supra note 42, at 15 (“Noticeably absent [from
section 510.30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure adopted in 1970] was the language from the
Temporary Commission’s 1968 study bill that would have allowed the judge to consider whether
a defendant ‘would be a danger to society or himself at liberty during the pendency of the action
or proceeding.’”); People ex rel. Lobell v. McDonnell, 71 N.E.2d 423, 425 (N.Y. 1947) (“The
bailing court has a large discretion, but it is a judicial, not a pure or unfettered discretion. The
case calls for a fact determination, not a mere fiat. The factual matters to be taken into account
include: ‘[t]he nature of the offense, the penalty, which may be imposed, the probability of the
willing appearance of the defendant or his flight to avoid punishment, the pecuniary and social
condition of defendant and his general reputation and character, and the apparent nature and
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In New York, the sole purpose of pretrial conditions like bail has
been to ensure that a criminal defendant returns to court at a future
date.150 Even amid the turbulence surrounding New York’s bail laws in
recent years—and around the consideration of public safety, in
particular—this remains the case today.151 When Governor Cuomo
embarked on revamping New York’s bail system, he opted not to
propose introducing public safety into the equation of judges’ bail
decision-making.152 Thus far, the Legislature has maintained the status
quo on that front.153
In Governor Cuomo’s 2019 Justice Agenda, Cuomo expressly
prioritized bail and pretrial detention reform, with the specific goal of
removing a defendant’s wealth as a factor impacting their pretrial
status.154 Democratic state leadership echoed Cuomo’s goals,155 as did
Cuomo’s executive proposal submitted to the New York Senate and
strength of the proof as bearing on the probability of his conviction.” (internal citations
omitted)).
150 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.10.
151 See id.
152 “New York is one of only four states in the nation that does not allow public safety to
be taken into consideration in release and bail decisions. This approach means people
in New York who do not present a risk to public safety, but cannot afford bail, are
detained while those who may present a risk to public safety can post bail and gain
release. As part of the Governor’s Justice Agenda, legislation submitted with the
Budget will end cash bail so that no one is detained because they cannot afford the cost
of bail.”
ANDREW CUOMO, FY 2020 EXECUTIVE BUDGET 130 (2019).
153 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.10.
154 “Governor Cuomo is advancing legislation that will end cash bail once and for all,
significantly reduce the number of people held in jail pretrial, and ensure due process
for anyone awaiting trial behind bars. Right now, money stands in the way of freedom
for too many presumed-innocent New Yorkers. . . . [T]he legislation will eliminate
money as a means of deciding who is free and who is not. Instead, people will be
released first on their own recognizance, or, only if the judge makes necessary findings,
under pretrial conditions. . . . This legislation will protect the rights of presumed
innocent people to remain free before trial, with as few conditions of release as
possible, reserving detention as the carefully determined exception rather than the
rule.”
2019 JUSTICE AGENDA, supra note 15, at 140–42.
155 Speaker Carl Heastie explained that “[w]ealth should not determine whether a person,
accused but not convicted of a crime, will be jailed while awaiting trial. The budget reforms New
York State’s bail system by . . . substituting release on recognizance or on non-monetary
conditions when appropriate.” Press Release, Carl E. Heastie, Assemb. Speaker, SFY 19-20
Budget Includes Critical Criminal Justice Reform Legislation and Funding (Apr. 1, 2019),
https://nyassembly.gov/Press/files/20190401a.php
[https://perma.cc/3LT2-B7RQ].
Assemblymember Latrice Walker added, “Every year, thousands of New Yorkers are incarcerated
awaiting trial because of unreasonably high bail that is impossible for most minority families to
meet. But change is upon us. . . . This budget will reassure New Yorkers that in this state, justice
is not for sale.” Id.
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Assembly in January 2019.156 Although Cuomo’s initial vision of
removing the use of bail altogether did not come to fruition, and
although New York courts have acknowledged Cuomo’s intent,157 the
bail reforms that Cuomo would later sign into law fail to achieve the
semi-aspirational ends he preached from the onset of his efforts.
B.

Prohibitively High Partially Secured or Unsecured Bonds

On first glance, the reformed provisions guiding how judges fix
bail appear to reduce economic inequality in New York’s pretrial
system. After all, judges now must offer individuals at least three
options for posting bail, upped from two in the law’s previous
iteration.158 And at least one of those three options must be a partially
secured surety bond or unsecured surety bond,159 regarded as “two of
the least onerous forms of bail.”160 Even further, judges now must
consider whether fixing bail would impose an undue financial hardship
on the individual.161 These are all positive, if not necessary, steps to
reducing economic inequality in the pretrial criminal justice system.
However, one provision in the bail statutes—a provision that
preceded these most recent reform efforts—has managed to survive
iteration after iteration of the law. That is, that judges “may designate
different amounts varying with the forms” of bail that judges choose to

156 S. 1505, 2019–2020 Leg. Sess., Part AA (N.Y. 2019), https://legislation.nysenate.gov/pdf/
bills/2019/s1505 [https://perma.cc/8Y6V-UEJD] (“This state, like most across the United States,
has for far too long needlessly incarcerated those meant to be guaranteed a presumption of
innocence simply because of an inability to pay bail and have forced those same people to choose
between facing lengthy prison sentences or a speedy return to society without providing them
with sufficient information regarding the case against them. This Part will usher into New York
true reforms in the areas of bail . . . . [T]he bill breaks the link between paying money and earning
freedom, so that defendants are either released on their own recognizance or, failing that, released
under non-monetary conditions.”). In a Memorandum in Support of the FY 2020 New York State
Executive Budget, the reforms to bail and pretrial detention were summarized as follows: “New
York’s current bail system fails to recognize that freedom before trial should be the rule, not the
exception, and by tying freedom to money, it has created a two-tiered system that puts an unfair
burden on the economically disadvantaged.” MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF FY 2020 NEW YORK
STATE EXECUTIVE BUDGET 39 (2019), https://www.budget.ny.gov/pubs/archive/fy20/exec/artvii/
ppgg-artvii-ms.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RAW-QUQ2].
157 See, e.g., People v. Steininger, 117 N.Y.S.3d 512, 521 (Sup. Ct. 2019) (“[T]he bail reform
law was also designed to significantly reduce disparities based on wealth and reduce pretrial
incarceration in any case where a court chose to set monetary bail.”).
158 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 520.10(2)(b).
159 Id.
160 See 2019 BAIL REFORM IN NEW YORK, supra note 16, at 4.
161 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(1)(f).
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fix.162 That the Legislature retained this pesky language removes the
decision whether to take the step of reducing pretrial inequality from
the hands of the Legislature and drops it squarely on the shoulders of
New York supreme court or criminal court judges.
Although judges are prohibited from setting “excessive” bail, they
retain otherwise limitless leeway in designating the dollar amount of
bail and the difference in amount between each option.163 For example,
it is not uncommon for judges to set cash bail, secured or partially
secured surety, and appearance bonds all at the same time, although
judges rarely opt to set unsecured bonds.164 The statute provides no
guidance on how the amount for each of these methods should compare
to one another.165 Thus, judges set surety or appearance bonds that
exceed the amount of cash bail.166 Some argue that one reason for this
disparity is that unsecured bonds provide little incentive for the
individual to return to court,167 even though an individual out on an
unsecured bond who fails to return to court will be liable for the entirety
of the often-exorbitant unsecured bond. A common result of
prohibitively high partially secured or unsecured bonds, then, is that
defendants are unable to meet any of the methods, resulting in their
pretrial detention. This all-too-common result flies in the face of the
very purpose of this newly added section of the bail laws.168

162 Id. § 520.10(2)(b). This language has been embedded within the statute since the modern
statutory bail scheme was enacted in 1971.
163 See id.; U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752 (1987).
164 See Akash Mehta, A Broken Bond: How New York Judges Are Getting Around Bail Reform,
CITY (Oct. 12, 2020, 4:00 AM), https://www.thecity.nyc/2020/10/12/21512018/new-york-judgesgetting-around-bail-reform-bond [https://perma.cc/6JCR-CLSJ] (“But since the mandate took
effect Jan. 1, judges across New York have seldom used one of these bail forms, ‘unsecured
bonds,’ and have set the other, [partially secured bonds], at dramatically higher rates than
traditional bail.”).
165 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 520.10(2)(b).
166 According to the Office of Court Administration, judges in Brooklyn Criminal Court have
only set unsecured bonds in 0.3% of cases, and partially secured bonds were on average set 140%
of the commercial bond amount and 268% of the cash bail amount. Citywide data collected by
New York County Defender Services and Court Watch NYC show that partially secured bonds
are set on average at 144% of commercial bonds and 232% of cash bail. Mehta, supra note 164.
167 For example, one New York Supreme Court judge wrote that

[w]here . . . a defendant is indigent or has very limited means, an unsecured bond
provides defendant with little incentive to return to court. In such a case the defendant
knows that if he or she fails to return to court as required, the amount of the unsecured
bond likely cannot ever be collected as a practical matter.
People v. Portoreal, 116 N.Y.S.3d 514, 525 (Sup. Ct. 2019).
168 Assemblymember Latrice Walker, a sponsor of the 2019 bail reforms, remarked, “What
that sounds like is an unequal administration of justice.” Mehta, supra note 164. Unequal
administration of justice is the precise problem the reforms were intended to combat.
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Although the purpose of requiring judges to fix partially secured
bonds is to make it more likely that an individual can post bail, thereby
decreasing the pretrial prison population and removing wealth from the
equation, by setting prohibitively high partially secured bonds, judges
can make it even less likely that a less-wealthy individual can post bail.
Providing multiple methods of bail is intended to increase the
likelihood that one such method will work for a defendant, meaning
they can remain free during the pendency of their trial, all while the
court can ensure that the individual will show up when needed because
of what the defendant has placed at risk. Placing this burden on judges
who are not necessarily committed to the same goals as the Legislature
has proved ineffective.169 Three examples illustrate this failure of the
revised bail law to make it more likely that an individual can avoid
pretrial detention while ensuring that they return to court: (1) the case
of J.S.,170 (2) the case of an unnamed defendant,171 and (3) People v.
Chensky.172
1.

The Case of J.S.

After J.S. was arrested in April 2020, a Bronx judge set cash bail at
$30,000 and a partially secured bond at $50,000.173 J.S. and his family
were unable to cobble together $30,000 to pay cash bail.174 That left just
the partially secured bond, which meant J.S.’s family would have to
provide the court with a ten percent refundable deposit—in this case,
$5,000—to secure J.S.’s release. J.S.’s girlfriend managed to come up
with the money, but J.S. remained in jail for a month as the judge
required J.S.’s girlfriend to provide complicated paperwork to prove her
income before the bond was approved.175 In all, J.S. remained in jail for
six months following his arrest in the midst of the COVID-19
pandemic, even though he remained legally innocent.176
Even though J.S. and his family ultimately posted the partially
secured bond, J.S. spent six months in jail during a deadly pandemic for
169 “Judges have ‘defeated the intent of the Legislature by setting the [partially secured bond]
amount so high that no one can post it,’ said Timothy Donaher, the chief public defender of
Monroe County.” Mehta, supra note 164.
170 See infra Section II.B.1; Mehta, supra note 164.
171 See infra Section II.B.2; Mehta, supra note 164.
172 See infra Section II.B.3; People v. Chensky, 120 N.Y.S.3d 621 (Sup. Ct. 2020).
173 Presumably, a third unreachable form of bail was fixed to abide by the statute. See Mehta,
supra note 164.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id.
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no reason other than the fact that the court hesitated to approve the
bond, given his family’s precarious financial position.177 Although a
partially secured bond has the potential to make the lives of families like
J.S.’s easier after a family member is arrested, that has not borne out in
reality when the partially secured bonds are set so much higher than
cash bail and when the individual and their family lack financial means.
While judges are now somewhat restrained in how many and which
types of bail they may fix, they retain complete discretion in the actual
bail amounts.178 That discretion leads to cases like J.S.’s, in which lesswealthy individuals spend months on end in jail awaiting trial as a direct
consequence of their lack of financial means, while wealthier
individuals make bail and retain some semblance of freedom.179
2.

The Case of an Unnamed Defendant

In January 2020, an unnamed man—let us refer to him as John—
was arrested.180 In September 2020, a Queens Supreme Court judge
fixed three forms of bail for John’s release as follows: (1) $75,000 cash
bail; (2) $75,000 insurance company bond; and (3) $750,000 partially
secured bond.181 John could not make cash bail.182 His family could not
afford the nonrefundable ten percent fee—$7,500—that accompanied
the insurance company bond.183 That left the partially secured bond,
specifically enumerated in the statute as one of two required options for
judges, since it is typically a less onerous form of bail. However, at that
amount, it would require an up-front refundable deposit of $75,000—
the same amount as cash bail, although riskier in comparison. John and
his family could not post the partially secured bond.184 Thus, John
remained in jail pending trial for nothing more than his lack of financial
wealth.185

Id.
See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 520.10 (McKinney 2020).
179 “By setting [partially secured bonds] at rates unaffordable for many defendants, criminal
justice advocates and public defenders say, judges, who have complete discretion, have in effect
nullified a program instituted by the legislature to free more poor people from jail.” Mehta, supra
note 164.
180 See id.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 See id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
177
178
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People v. Chensky

On January 15, 2020, Joseph Chensky was arrested and charged
with two separate counts of Grand Larceny in the Fourth Degree.186
Neither of these felonies qualified for bail under the reformed bail
law.187 The court released Chensky on his own recognizance.188 Twelve
days later, Chensky failed to appear for his court date.189 Another week
later, Chensky again failed to appear.190 As a result, the court issued a
bench warrant for Chensky’s arrest, and Chensky was rearrested on
February 7.191 Chensky’s “persistent” and “willful” failures to appear
rendered his offense bail-eligible.192 Under the statute instructing judges
on fixing bail, the court set cash bail at $10,000, bond at $30,000,193 and
unsecured surety bond at an exorbitant $300,000.194 The court satisfied
the requirements of the statute by fixing at least three forms of bail and
by fixing either an unsecured surety bond or a partially secured surety
bond.
It is unclear whether Chensky was able to post any of these three
forms of bail. However, especially given the nature of the charged
offenses, it would be no surprise to learn that Chensky did not have a
spare $10,000 cash laying around or that he and his family lacked the
nonrefundable $3,000 deposit due to a bail bond company. That left just
the $300,000 unsecured bond, which would only become due upon
Chensky’s failure to appear in court. Detractors of the unsecured bond
would argue it provides no incentive to return to court, as it would be
difficult to collect the amount from an individual who fails to appear
and who may be judgment-proof, although wages can be garnished over

People v. Chensky, 120 N.Y.S.3d 621, 622 (Sup. Ct. 2020).
Id.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 622.
190 Id. at 623.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 623–24; see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.60(2)(b) (McKinney 2020)
(“[W]henever in the course of a criminal action or proceeding a defendant charged with the
commission of an offense is at liberty as a result of an order of recognizance, release under nonmonetary conditions or bail issued pursuant to this article it shall be grounds for revoking such
order and fixing bail in such criminal action or proceeding when the court has found, by clear
and convincing evidence, that the defendant persistently and willfully failed to appear after notice
of scheduled appearances in the case before the court . . . .”).
193 Although the decision does not specify, for the sake of this analysis, I assume this refers to
an insurance company bail bond for which Chensky would need to pay a commercial bail bond
company a ten percent nonrefundable fee of three thousand dollars to secure his release.
194 Chensky, 120 N.Y.S.3d at 624.
186
187
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time, for example, to satisfy an unsecured bond that has become due.195
Taking that as fact for the sake of argument, none of the three forms of
bail fixed by the judge in Chensky would reasonably assure that he
would return to court in the future, which is, after all, the sole reason
that bail exists in New York.196
C.

The Meaning of “Activities and History”

Although legislative history tells us that New York judges may not
consider “dangerousness” or risk to public safety when making bail
decisions,197 the actual language of New York’s reformed bail law fails
to send the same message.198 Conspicuously absent from the bail law is
any mention of public safety or dangerousness.199 In its stead is the
phrase “activities and history,” as in, judges must take into account an
individual’s “activities and history” when determining the least
restrictive conditions necessary to secure the individual’s return to
court.200 However, neither the phrase as a whole, nor the individual
words “activities” or “history,” are defined by the statute.201
Notwithstanding the legislative history, these vague, amorphous words
forming this vague, amorphous phrase give judges carte blanche to
consider just about anything they can think up when determining the
least restrictive conditions necessary to secure an individual’s return to
court.
Further, this provision of the bail law appears to be non-exhaustive
in nature. The statute provides that when determining the least
restrictive conditions, judges must consider factors “including” those
enumerated in the statute.202 The use of the term “including” indicates
that judges may look outside the corners of the statute and consult other
factors for further guidance on making these bail decisions.203 Without
See, e.g., People v. Portoreal, 116 N.Y.S.3d 514, 525–26 (Sup. Ct. 2019).
See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.10.
197 See supra Section II.A.
198 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(1).
199 See id.
200 See id. § 510.30(1)(a).
201 The provision of the bail law that defines terms does not define these particular terms. See
id. § 500.10. The provision setting forth judges’ instructions for determining the least restrictive
conditions also fails to define these terms. See id. § 510.30. Black’s Law Dictionary is not
particularly instructive, defining “activity” as “[t]he collective acts of one person or of two or
more people engaged in a common enterprise.” Activity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed.
2019). Black’s Law Dictionary does not define the term “history.”
202 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(1) (emphasis added).
203 See People v. Portoreal, 116 N.Y.S.3d 514, 520–22 (Sup. Ct. 2019) (analyzing the meaning
of the revisions to this provision of the statute).
195
196
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much guidance, then, on what judges may or may not consider beyond
the statute’s list of factors, judges have yet another opportunity to read
into the statute whether an individual is a risk to public safety.204
The Legislature attempted to clear these muddied waters by adding
to the bail law that judges “shall explain [their] choice of release, release
with conditions, bail or remand on the record or in writing.”205 In some
cases, judges have provided thorough reasoning,206 while, in others, the
explanation is sorely lacking.207 Ultimately, even with this requirement,
it can be difficult to parse a judge’s reasoning behind bail decisions, and
it can be even more difficult to discern whether those decisions
accounted for “dangerousness” or public safety, whether intentionally
or implicitly. With that in mind, recent examples help to highlight this
ambiguity.
1.

People v. Connon

In People v. Connon, Connon had been charged with Criminal
Obstruction of Breathing and Endangering the Welfare of a Child,
neither of which is a qualifying offense per se under the reformed bail
law.208 However, since this particular incident was allegedly directed
against a member of Connon’s family or household, it became baileligible.209 Thus, the judge was tasked with determining the least

204

Judge Greenberg succinctly summarizes this difficulty in his Portoreal opinion:

On the one hand, the statute’s directive that the court consider—without any express
limitation—information that is “relevant” to the defendant’s return to court certainly
appears to be a broad and elastic “catch-all” provision that permits the court to
consider any factor the court deems relevant to the question whether the defendant is
likely to return to court. Yet, on the other hand, the use of the word “including” in
Revised CPL § 510.30(1)(a) makes the meaning of the Revised Bail Law unclear.
Id. at 521.
205 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.10(1).
206 See, e.g., People v. Brown, 129 N.Y.S.3d 298, 303–04 (Cnty. Ct. 2020); Portoreal, 116
N.Y.S.3d at 524–25.
207 See, e.g., People v. Connon, 136 N.Y.S.3d 844, 849 (City Ct. 2020) (explaining in a single
sentence that “the defendant’s three prior felony convictions and prior probation delinquency
convince[] the Court that bail is the least restrictive method for securing the defendant’s return
to Court notwithstanding other factors militating in favor of his release on lesser restrictions”);
People v. Hood, No. CR-1395-20, 2020 WL 1672425, at *1 (N.Y. City Ct. Apr. 4, 2020) (“After
determining that Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree is a qualifying offense
for purposes of New York’s bail statute, and after reviewing the relevant statutory factors, I also
concluded that bail is the least restrictive kind and degree of control or restriction necessary to
secure Defendant’s return to court when required.” (internal citations omitted)).
208 Connon, 136 N.Y.S.3d at 846.
209 Id. at 846–47.
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restrictive conditions that would ensure Connon’s return to court.210
After considering the statutory factors, including, of course, Connon’s
“activities and history,” the judge decided to fix monetary bail.211
In explaining his reasoning behind the decision, the judge
appeared to rely heavily on Connon’s three prior felony convictions,
although it was not explained how that sample of Connon’s activities
and history weighed in the judge’s decision-making.212 It is possible
that, as a result of those three prior felony convictions, the judge viewed
Connon as a threat to public safety, leading the judge to fix monetary
bail. Without the benefit of sufficiently detailed reasoning on the
record, it is hard to imagine that Connon’s “dangerousness” did not
factor into the judge’s decision-making.
2.

People v. Lang

In People v. Lang, the seventy-eight-year-old Lang was awaiting a
new trial and sought to be released on his own recognizance or on
nonmonetary conditions in the lead up to the new trial.213 Lang had
been convicted of second-degree murder after he shot and killed his
brother in 2012.214 After an issue with an alternate juror, the New York
Court of Appeals reversed an order by the Appellate Division affirming
the conviction.215 Second-degree murder remains a qualifying offense,
and the judge was tasked with determining the least restrictive
conditions to secure Lang’s return to court.216
In accounting for Lang’s “activities and history,” the judge noted
Lang’s lack of prior criminal convictions, that there was no evidence he
was anything other than a model prisoner, that Lang had no record of
flight to avoid criminal prosecution, and, specifically, that Lang did not
attempt to flee to avoid prosecution in the eleven days he remained free
after his arrest.217 Yet, the judge emphasized the nature of Lang’s
particular offense and specifically the nature of his actions giving rise to
Id. at 849.
While this case is an example of judges’ leeway to read “dangerousness” into the statute, it
doubles as an example of the reforms reducing inequality in the pretrial system through judges
setting more manageable amounts of monetary bail. Here, the judge fixed bail as follows: (1) cash
bail at $1,000; (2) insurance company bond at $1,000; or (3) partially secured surety bond at
$2,000 with a ten percent deposit. Id.
212 See id.
213 People v. Lang, No. CR-12-034-I, 2020 WL 5552874, at *1, *4 (N.Y. Cnty. Ct. July 20, 2020).
214 Id. at *1.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id. at *1–2.
210
211
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this case.218 The judge refrained from explicitly calling Lang dangerous
or a risk to public safety. However, the judge’s bail decision, combined
with the judge’s reasoning, reflects such a conclusion. The judge opted
to fix three forms of bail in the following inflated amounts: (1) $500,000
cash bail; (2) $2,000,000 insurance company bail bond; or (3)
$2,000,000 partially secured surety bond with a ten percent deposit.219
III. PROPOSAL
A.

Regulating Dollar Amounts of Monetary Bail

The current state of New York’s bail law affords judges nearly
unrestricted discretion to set bail at amounts so high that the intention
of the reforms to reduce economic inequality in the criminal justice
system is easily sidestepped. Although the new requirement that judges
must fix at least one of a partially secured surety bond or unsecured
surety bond is a step in the right direction, judges’ unfettered discretion
renders the requirement nearly toothless. Assuming that eliminating
monetary bail outright is not a politically likely outcome for the time
being, and assuming that the Legislature would be unwilling to
eliminate the decades-old language in the statute allowing judges to fix
bail in differing dollar amounts, we must look elsewhere for possible
solutions.
A Bronx County Supreme Court judge authored a possible
resolution to this dilemma in his decision in People v. Portoreal.220 After
thoroughly laying out the machinations of New York’s bail law
following the 2019 reforms,221 the judge reiterated that the Legislature
intended to make it more likely that a given individual could post bail
through the reforms.222 The judge also maintained that the lack of an
up-front deposit accompanying unsecured bonds means that they
provide little incentive for an individual to return to court.223
Having decided, in this particular case, that monetary bail was the
least restrictive condition that would reasonably assure the defendant’s

Id. at *3.
Id. at *4–5.
220 See generally People v. Portoreal, 116 N.Y.S.3d 514 (Sup. Ct. 2019).
221 Id. at 518–24.
222 “Plainly, the Legislature intended that some defendants who cannot afford an insurance
company bail bond should still be able to afford a partially-secured surety bond; otherwise, the
provision of the Revised Bail Law mandating the availability of partially-secured bonds would
have no practical meaning.” Id. at 526.
223 Id.
218
219
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return to court, and having decided that an unsecured bond in any
dollar amount would do little to achieve that end, the judge then set out
on fixing the appropriate partially secured bond.224 He haphazardly
reasoned that a partially secured bond amount should exceed an
insurance company bail bond, since, dollar amounts being equal, the
partially secured bond provides less of a financial incentive for a
defendant to return to court.225 Meanwhile, the judge noted that setting
the partially secured bond significantly higher than the insurance
company bail bond would circumvent the Legislature’s goals.226 The
judge’s solution was simple, yet arbitrary and seemingly pulled out of
thin air: a partially secured bond should not be set more than three
times higher than an insurance company bail bond.227 Thus, in
Portoreal, the judge fixed bail in the following amounts: (1) $50,000
cash bail; (2) $200,000 insurance company bail bond; or (3) $250,000
partially secured bond.228 The outcome of Portoreal—setting three
unaffordable forms of bail—underscores the flaw in this judge’s
conception—a flaw that might yet be remedied with further tweaking.
As exemplified by Portoreal, the widespread consequence of the
judge’s idea would likely be higher bail amounts across the board.
Without capping cash bail or insurance company bail bond amounts,
judges would be tempted to raise those amounts to meet the “three
times” requirement proposed by this judge, instead of lowering the
partially secured bond amount to meet that same requirement. But
codifying the judge’s idea into the bail law and building upon it might
yet prove helpful to achieve the Legislature’s goals. The Legislature
could build upon the Portoreal judge’s idea in three ways: (1) by capping
cash bail and insurance company bail bonds at certain amounts, (2) by
creating a presumption that judges set unsecured bonds rather than
partially secured bonds, and (3) by reducing the maximum percentage
of the undertaking that judges may require as an up-front deposit for
partially secured bonds.
In all, the revised bail law would look something like this: When
judges determine that fixing monetary bail is the least restrictive
condition that would reasonably ensure an individual’s return to
court,229 judges would still be required to set three forms of bail, at least
one of which would have to be a partially secured bond or unsecured
Id. at 525–27.
Id. at 526.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 526–27.
228 Id. at 527.
229 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.10 (McKinney 2020). Ideally, this would be an
increasingly infrequent outcome.
224
225
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bond.230 The revised statute would devise a cap on cash bail and on
insurance company bail bonds. When deciding between setting either a
partially secured bond or unsecured bond—assuming judges are
unlikely to set both—there would be a presumption that judges shall
opt for the unsecured bond unless the individual presents an acutely
high risk of flight to avoid prosecution or has a history of failing to
return to court. When judges select partially secured bonds, judges
would be limited to setting them only so much higher than the amount
of cash bail or insurance company bond—for the sake of clarity, let us
say judges may only set partially secured bonds up to 120 percent of
cash bail or an insurance company bail bond. Lastly, if a judge opts for
a partially secured bond, the maximum that judges could require as an
up-front deposit would be reduced from ten percent of the bond to,
perhaps, one percent.
Having built on the judge’s approach in this fashion, the dollar
amount of each of the three forms of bail that judges must set will be
both lower and closer in value. With a cap in place on cash bail and
insurance company bail bonds, the previously untethered partially
secured bond will now be anchored and more manageable for
individuals to post. But in all such cases, the presumption in favor of
the unsecured bond will often not require an individual to make any
sort of up-front deposit. In all, this revision to New York’s bail law
would meet the Legislature’s goal of reducing how one’s wealth impacts
their freedom pending trial, while continuing to ensure that individuals
return to court.
B.

Revamping “Activities and History”

The simplest path to excising, once and for all, public safety and
“dangerousness” from judges’ considerations when determining the
least restrictive conditions to ensure an individual returns to court
would be to insert language to that effect directly into the statute.
However, given the heated and polarized debate that has ensued each
time the issue of public safety arises in the context of bail reform,231 that
might be the path of most resistance, the path least likely to succeed, and
maybe even the path most likely to backfire. Alternatively, the phrase
“activities and history” could be removed from the statute altogether,
though this is also unlikely to provide the sought-after clarity. Since the
list of factors for judges to consider is non-exhaustive,232 judges would
230
231
232

See id. § 520.10.
See supra Section II.A.
See Portoreal, 116 N.Y.S.3d at 520–22.
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remain free to consider “activities and history,” and countless other
factors, even if the phrase were no longer to appear explicitly in the
statute.
Therein lies the first affirmative step towards eliminating public
safety and “dangerousness” from factoring into bail outcomes. The
Legislature should consider simply replacing the word “including” with
the phrase “limited to.” In doing so, the Legislature would explicitly
confine judges to the enumerated list of factors within the statute. The
Legislature might then consider revising the list of factors, but, in any
case, this revision would give judges a finite number of considerations,
none of which involve public safety or “dangerousness.”
This change, though, does not cure the ambiguity of the phrase
“activities and history.” Defining the phrase as excluding public safety
and “dangerousness” is unlikely to come to fruition, again due to the
contentious nature of similar debates in years past. Beyond this option,
the Legislature could consider refining the statutory language involving
how judges explain their decisions. Currently, the bail law provides that
judges “shall explain [their] choice of release, release with conditions,
bail or remand on the record or in writing.”233 Requiring judges to
explain their reasoning has the potential to be an effective way of
holding judges to account and ensuring they only contemplate the
appropriate considerations. But the statute as written allows judges to
skate by with the most bare-bones of explanations of their reasoning.
While it might be outside the scope of the Legislature to tell judges how
to write their decisions, the Legislature should consider requiring
judges to reaffirm on the record or in writing that they have not
considered public safety or “dangerousness” when determining the least
restrictive conditions to ensure an individual’s return to court.
It is not possible to get inside of a judge’s head to truly understand
their reasoning, beyond what they put on the record or in writing. No
matter what the text of the statute says, there must always be a leap of
faith that judges stay true to the considerations the Legislature affords
them in making decisions involving pretrial conditions. While no
revision to the statute can absolutely ensure that judges will not factor
public safety and “dangerousness” into these decisions, this
requirement can, at the very least, serve as a frequent reminder to judges
of what remains in-bounds and what lies out-of-bounds when judges
make these critical pretrial decisions.

233

N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.10(1).
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CONCLUSION
As demonstrated, New York’s bail reform travails of the past few
years have fallen flat in reducing the impact of economic inequality in
pretrial detention outcomes. Although the revised bail law has already
decreased jail and prison populations considerably,234 a goal of the
reforms from the outset,235 New York’s criminal justice system and its
pretrial detention system, in particular, continue to treat most harshly
those with the least financial means. More important than failing to live
up to the Governor’s and Legislature’s promises, the previous sentence
describes an inherently unjust justice system: a system deploying
something closer to a presumption of guilt—a presumption of guilt only
for those of lesser financial means, that is—than we often profess. As
Bryan Stevenson has presented, we operate “a system of criminal justice
that continues to treat people better if they are rich and guilty than if
they are poor and innocent.”236 Hope endures though, as bail reform
efforts spearheaded by dedicated activists and reformers make inroads
nationwide, and as the injustice of bail laws around the country begin
to enter into the nation’s collective conscience.237
The United States claims to regard as sacrosanct its presumption
of innocence. In 1987 Chief Justice Rehnquist told us that “[i]n our
society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial
is the carefully limited exception.”238 But then, as now, that is not
reality.239 That is not reality for the thousands upon thousands of people

See BAIL REFORM REVISITED, supra note 37, at 8–15.
2019 JUSTICE AGENDA, supra note 15, at 140.
236 BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY: A STORY OF JUSTICE AND REDEMPTION 313 (paperback
ed. 2015).
237 For example, Illinois lawmakers recently voted to end the use of cash bail. See Isaac Scher,
Illinois Will End Cash Bail—And Limit Use of High-Tech Incarceration, INTERCEPT (Jan. 17, 2021,
7:00 AM), https://theintercept.com/2021/01/17/illinois-cash-bail-reform [https://perma.cc/
CSQ9-FMYE].
238 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (emphasis added).
239 The following anecdote, tweeted by Rhiannon Hamam, a public defender in Texas and
cohost of the 5-4 podcast, captures the sobering reality of this sentiment:
234
235

I’m on hold with a county jail and the hold message playing references to people on
the inside as “offenders.” More than 70% of people in this county jail have not been
found guilty of a crime, they haven’t “offended” any law. Presumption of innocence
where[?]
@AywaRhiannon, TWITTER (Jan. 17, 2021, 8:15 PM), https://twitter.com/AywaRhiannon/status/
1350974958181228549 [https://perma.cc/5VNX-K37T]; see also Claire Lampen, The Prison
Abolitionist Redefining What It Means to Win, CUT (Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.thecut.com/
2021/01/rhiannon-hamam-how-i-get-it-done.html [https://perma.cc/2ZYB-U8CH].
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confined to jails, yet presumed innocent, for no reason other than the
fact that they lack the financial means to get out.
That was not reality for Brandon Rodriguez, a twenty-five-year-old
Staten Island man, who took his own life on August 10, 2021, while
incarcerated pretrial at Rikers Island.240 Mr. Rodriguez was arrested on
August 4, 2020, and he lacked the financial means to post cash bail of
$5,000 or a bond set at $15,000, causing his incarceration pending
trial.241 The State of New York may have reformed its pretrial detention
system since Kalief Browder’s passing in 2015, but the reforms have not
stamped out the injustices wrought by excessive bail and economic
inequality. Mr. Rodriguez—a legally innocent man—was punished with
a death penalty of sorts not for the commission of any crime, but rather
for his lack of monetary wealth.242
Writing this Note in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic,243 with
social justice movements reinvigorated following continued police
killings of Black Americans including George Floyd and Breonna
Taylor,244 and following the January 6, 2021, attack on the United States
Capitol, a reframing of the debate around bail is in order. Instead of
expressing outrage at the few individuals who are able to remain free

240 George Joseph, Twenty-Five Year Old Detainee Found Dead at Rikers, GOTHAMIST (Aug.
12, 2021, 4:03 PM), https://gothamist.com/news/twenty-five-year-old-detainee-found-deadrikers [https://perma.cc/BVE4-L75G].
241 At arraignment, a judge first set Mr. Rodriguez’s cash bail at $5,000 and a bond at $15,000,
before reducing the amounts days later to $3,000 and $10,000 respectively. Id.; Graham Rayman,
Staten Island Detainee Hangs Himself in NYC Jail Using T-Shirt: Sources, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug.
13, 2021, 7:35 PM), https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/ny-man-dead-rikersisland-20210813-4dmqk7zi2rbcbp2ntfwxdho2ba-story.html [https://perma.cc/3Y6W-DNM7];
Tracey Porpora, Staten Island Man Found Dead in Prison Was Result of Alleged Suicide, Report
Says, SILIVE.COM (Aug. 14, 2021, 9:14 AM), https://www.silive.com/news/2021/08/staten-islandman-found-dead-in-prison-was-result-of-alleged-suicide-report-says.html [https://perma.cc/
SDV7-HSJ9].
242 Mr. Rodriguez’s ordeal exemplifies Bryan Stevenson’s notion that “[t]he opposite of
poverty is not wealth; the opposite of poverty is justice.” See STEVENSON, supra note 236, at 18.
243 The pandemic has wreaked acute devastation throughout jails and prisons across the
United States. Given the cramped and confined nature of these facilities, combined with
unsanitary conditions, inadequate testing, and a general apathy toward vaccinating people who
are incarcerated along with employees of these facilities, jails and prisons quickly became hotbeds
for the spread of the virus. See generally Schwartzapfel, Park & Demillo, supra note 131. Rikers
Island, in particular, has become a “humanitarian crisis” during the pandemic due to high
infection rates, rising inmate populations, staffing shortages, delays in court proceedings, and
official mismanagement. Deanna Paul, Rikers Island Conditions Spiral Out of Control for Inmates
and Officers, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 19, 2021, 11:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/rikers-islandconditions-spiral-out-of-control-for-inmates-and-officers-11632063601
[https://perma.cc/
ZY6D-BLF7].
244 The inclusion of these names is in no way meant to exclude the many, many others lost to
police violence.
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pending trial—even those accused of committing heinous acts245—
perhaps we should channel this frustration into remedying the havoc
wreaked upon the lives of thousands upon thousands of people by an
unjust system of pretrial detention.

245 See, e.g., Travis Caldwell, Prosecutors Push to Rearrest Kyle Rittenhouse. Here’s How the
Case Has Unfolded Since He Posted Bail, CNN (Feb. 4, 2021, 9:50 AM), https://www.cnn.com/
2021/02/04/us/kyle-rittenhouse-since-arrest-bail/index.html [https://perma.cc/WZA4-YBTV];
Natalie Parks, UK Senior Charged in Capitol Riot Released on $10,000 Bail After Court
Appearance, KENTUCKYKERNEL (Jan. 27, 2021), http://www.kykernel.com/uk-senior-charged-incapitol-riot-released-on-10-000-bail-after-court-appearance/article_ac0d570e-5ac6-11eb-bf6b937095f80615.html [https://perma.cc/J8SL-GUW9]; Woman Who Allegedly Helped Steal Pelosi
Laptop to Be Released from Jail, GUARDIAN (Jan. 21, 2021, 12:04 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/jan/21/riley-june-williams-nancy-pelosi-laptopcapitol-jail-release [https://perma.cc/4WV3-SLJC].

